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The Myth of Political Participation among Asian Americans

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The Myth of Political Participation among Asian Americans

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Dedication

To Mom, Dad, sisters, Donald, and the Mighty Hand, for so much love, wisdom, and strength.

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The Myth of Political Participation among Asian Americans

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Although Asian Americans have the highest growth rate, their electoral participation does not commensurate with their numerical strength. This research explores the causes of Asian Americans' low level of electoral participation. I argue that acculturation presents barriers for Asian Americans to exert their political power. This project combined a survey-based experiment on and in-depth interviews with Asian Americans in Austin, in addition to existing data (CPS and the PNAAPS).

I first estimate the effects of socioeconomic status on turnout across racial and ethnic groups. The results demonstrate that while education and income have limited effects on Asian American turnout at the aggregate level, their positive influence on turnout still holds for Asian Americans at the individual level, though the effect varies by nativity. Furthermore, education and income effects on turnout are greatest among Whites. The differences of these effects between Whites and Asians are especially prominent among the higher socioeconomic stratum. I next find that acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and hybrid identity elevate levels of turnout among Asian Americans. Those who are more residentially stable and sense shared Asian culture are more likely to vote, while the Asian-born are less likely to vote. In addition, experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination are likely to turn Asians away from their American-ness, while shared cultural commonality helps to foster the "Asian American"

identity. Last, the experiment results suggest that a lack of ethnic cues for Asian Americans may have contributed to their low turnout rates: Asian American voters value descriptive representation, and ethnic cues effectively operate among them, especially the less politically engaged. While voters' support for a coethnic candidate is evident in the study, the evidence of their cross- or pan-ethnic support is limited.

The project provides a window into the political incorporation of immigrant populations. The study speaks to the literature on political participation, racial/ethnic politics and identity politics. In addition, the findings broaden our understanding of minority political behavior, and the process by which immigrant populations incorporate into American political system, a promise of democratic representation.

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CHAPTER ONE: Effects Of Acculturation, Group Identity, And Ethnic Cues On Asian American Political Participation

Asian American political participation is one of the more puzzling phenomena in American mass behavior. Despite their relatively high levels of educational attainment and income, Asian Americans have the lowest turnout rates among all racial and ethnic groups. This project addresses factors that explain this unusual behavioral pattern. Furthermore, if Asian American political participation as a whole does not conform to the conventional wisdom positing a strange relationship between socioeconomic status and political mobilization, what strategies can energize Asian American voters?

The underlying motivations of the study are both theoretical and practical. As a theoretical matter, scholars of democratic politics are interested in the means by which members of the society, new or old, are successfully incorporated into the political system. The stability and prosperity of American democracy demands not only liberty, but also the representation of the entire panoply of group interests. Yet, new arrivals often encounter institutional, social, and psychological barriers that make this difficult. It is, therefore, important for scholars to understand the nature of these challenges to particular groups.

Practically, changes in the political party system of the United States tend to be driven by the mobilization of new group. Once formed, individual-level party attachments tend to last over time, unless dramatic events occur. Thus, in campaigns and elections, political elites not only mobilize the preexisting supporters, but also vie for the support among new participants in order to broaden the party's political territory. In contemporary American politics, metaphors of the "sleeping giant" and "awakening giant" convey the significant potential of Hispanic and Asian American electorates to shape the next party system.

In the following, I first define "Asian Americans" and outline the demographics of the Asian American population with a brief overview on their historical trajectories entering the United States. Next, I elaborate the causes that can help researchers understand Asian American political participation. Specifically, I emphasize the influence of acculturation experiences and group identity on political participation. I conclude this chapter by summarizing the project's larger research questions and theoretical framework.

THE ASIAN AMERICAN POPULATION

Who are "Asian Americans?" Similar to other panethnic identities, such as African Americans and Hispanics, Asian American encompasses a range of diverse groups. A panethnic identity is a socially constructed label applied (or ascribed) to different groups with various cultural traditions and languages (Espiritu 1992). Asian Americans include those with ancestries from East Asia (such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), Southeast Asia (such as Pilipino, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, and Indonesian), and South Asia (such as Asian Indian, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). According to the 2008 American Community Survey, Asian Americans of Chinese decent were the largest Asian group (3.6 million), followed by Filipinos (3.1 million), Asian Indians (2.73 million), Vietnamese (1.73 million), Koreans (1.61 million) and Japanese (1.30 million).[1]

By the 2010 Census, the estimated number of U.S. residents of Asian descent is 17.3 million comprising 5.6 percent of the total U.S. population, with sizeable

[1] These counts included people who were either of a particular Asian group only or were of that group in combination with one or more other Asian groups or races. The report is available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb10-ff07.html. (Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012)

concentrations in California, New York, and Texas.[2] The majority (67%) of those who identified as Asian American in the census survey were foreign born.[3] Foreign born Asian Americans outnumber the U.S.-born Asian Americans because the entrance of Asians was severely constrained by legislation prior to the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act (which granted equal chance of new comers from different corners of the world) (Takeda 2001). For example, the 1917 Immigration Act (a.k.a. the Asiatic Barred Zone Act) heavily regulated immigration of 'undesirables' from other countries with a focus on the area of Asia; similarly, the 1921 Emergency Quota Law strictly limited numbers of immigrants based on the country of birth.

Congressional regulations on immigration and varying public moods shaped various historical trajectories for each ethnic group (Takaki 1989). Prior to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese labors migrated to the U.S., especially to the West Coast, seeking job opportunities and escaping from problems in their homelands (Takaki 1989; Lien et al. 2004). Because the government deemed the coming of Chinese labors "endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory,"[4] this Act literally closed off Chinese worker migration until the middle of the twentieth century.

Japanese laborers first mainly migrated to Hawaii, then a territory of the United State since 1900. Decades before that, Japanese workers had moved to both Hawaii and the mainland driven by the demand for labor in agriculture (Takaki 1989, Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). In California, the intensified local hostility toward the growing number

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[2] The count includes "Asian alone" and "Asian in combination." The Census Bureau releases the profile on Asian/Pacific Americans with an update from the 2010 Census survey and the 2007 survey of Business Owners on the Asian and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander populations. The release is available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb11-ff06.html (Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012)

[3] The foreign-born population refers to those who were not U.S. citizen or U.S. national at birth. According to the 2007 American Community Survey, 68% of non-Hispanic Asian was foreign born (Grieco 2010). The report on "Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-born Population in the United States: 2007" is available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf (Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012)

[4] The full text of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 is available at http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/resources/archives/seven/chinxact.htm. (Last date of access: March 21, 2012)

of Japanese workers led to the 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement in which the Japanese Government agreed to deny passports to laborers intending to enter the U.S. and the U.S. agreed to let the brides and families of Japanese laborers enter and re-establish families. As a result, the Japanese American population today is largely U.S.-born.

To replace the vacancy of Chinese and Japanese workers, Korean and Asian Indian laborers were recruited (Takaki 1989). The path of Korean laborers was somewhat similar to Japanese: their main destinations were Hawaii and California. Their number was small until the 1965 Act.[5] Similarly, Asian Indian labors were recruited and migrated to the United States in the early twentieth century, until the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone Act that banned natives of East, South and Southeast Asia.[6]

Vietnamese and Filipino Americans are distinct from most other Asian immigrants. Unlike other Asian immigrants entering the United States for job opportunities, a massive exodus of Vietnamese political refugees entered the U.S. to avoid North Vietnamese troops during the Vietnam War in the 1970s (Takaki 1989). The 1975 immigration wave was composed of thousands of Vietnamese. Driven by the need for emotional and economic support, their concentration is especially evident in Orange County, California (Lai 2011).

The Filipinos, though they did not possess citizenship, were classified as "American nationals" because the U.S. acquired the Philippines at end of the Spanish-American War. During the early twentieth century, Filipino labor with families migrated to Hawaiian sugar plantation (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Though their American nationals status prevented them from being affected by the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917, Filipinos were classified as aliens under the Tydings-McDuffie Act (a.k.a. the Philippines Independence Act) which established the commonwealth status of the

[5] Incidents such as the 1990 Red Apple boycott in New York and the 1992 Los Angeles riot illustrates tensions between Korean grocers and other minority groups (Kim 2000).

[6] Unlike other Asians, Asian Indians were Caucasians with darker color skin (Takaki 1989). In addition, as part of Britain colony, Indian immigrants enter the United States with some degree of English proficiency.

Philippines (Takaki 1989, 331-332). As a result, Filipinos were no longer qualified for assistance from New Deal programs such as the National Youth Administration.

In spite of the different histories and cultural practices within the Asian American community, two factors bind individuals together: "Asian American" is both an ascribed label and a prescribed identity (Takeda 2001). First, non-Asian Americans, being relatively unable or uninterested in recognizing subtle differences in the appearances of different Asian ethnicities, have a tendency to group Chinese Americans together with Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans and other groups with Asian ancestory. The U.S. Census Bureau further reinforces this tendency by bracketing individuals of Asian descent as "Asian or Pacific Islander" Americans. Like it or not, Asian Americans are viewed as one large group despite great variation in languages and cultural practices.[7]

Second, the shared cultural similarities and experiences in the U.S. help members of different Asian ethnicities form a bond. For instance, cultural practices such as food choices and eating habits (e.g., rice and chopsticks), festival celebration (e.g., the lunar New Year), and familial structures (e.g., the hierarchical positions of family members) among Asian Americans forge a sense of shared cultural and societal values within the community. Conceptually, the "Asian American" panethnic identity connects individuals to a larger community in which members view themselves as occupying the same social position.

There is another source of pan-ethnic similarity: Asian Americans as a whole tend to have more socioeconomic resources than other racial and ethnic minority groups. Educational attainment for Asian Americans and non-Hispanic Whites is higher than African Americans and Hispanics (Ryan and Siebens 2012). Indeed, Census figures

[7] Two automobile workers beat Vincent Chin, a 27-year-old Chinese American, in June 1982 for blaming the loss of their jobs on foreign cars. The workers thought Chin was Japanese American. (http://www.freep.com/article/20110812/NEWS01/108120472/Vincent-Chin-s-beating-death-recalled-AAJA-convention) (last date of access: April 27, 2012)

indicate that Asian Americans ($75,027) have higher mean family income levels than non-Hispanic Whites ($62,545), African Americans ($38,409), or Hispanics ($39,730).[8]

This economic success requires additional comment as it is to the puzzle of low Asian American turnout. Three causes may have contributed to the socioeconomic success of Asian Americans. First, the 1965 Immigration Act allows three groups to enter the United States: political refugees, individuals with professional skills, and family members of those who are already in the country. As a result, an influx of professionals and highly skilled Asian workers set foot in the United States from 1960s through the twenty-first century.

Furthermore, economic security and the need for high education attainment are among the very highest priorities of Asian Americans. Job opportunities and the lure of prosperity attracted Asian laborers to the United States. Desires to achieve economic success outweigh concerns about hostile or discriminatory practices either at the workplace or in American society.

Last, in addition to the Asian cultural emphasis on education, education is considered the only way to increase one's social mobility, because Asian Americans encounter strict limitations on succeeding in other areas (Sue and Okazaki 1990). But this economic success has not translated into increased democratic participation nor have we seen Asian American interests particularly well represented in government. This is contra the experience of other nationalities (e.g., the Irish, Italians, or Polish) and runs contrary to our attendant theoretical expectations (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

[8] The figures are available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0697.pdf. (Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012)

ACCULTURATION EXPERIENCES, GROUP IDENTITY, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As suggested above, the prediction of higher participation and turnout among Asian Americans is not borne out in reality. Contrasting with African Americans and Hispanics, whose participation seems to increase if they can overcome the socioeconomic barriers, Asian Americans, mostly stay at home during elections despite having higher levels of aggregate education and income. To understand their paradoxical rates of political participation, researchers must understand the experiences of Asian Americans.

As mentioned earlier, the majority of the Asian American population is foreign-born. That implies the majority of Asian Americans are still in the acculturation process in which cultural and psychological changes take place resulting from contact between two or more cultural groups and individual members. Individual behavioral repertoires also change accordingly (Berry 2005). In short, acculturation experiences refer to the degree to which a person adapts to the present surroundings. Through this process individuals experience collision and negotiation between the culture from their homelands and the culture of the host society, the result is typically some form of adaptation and adjustment.

To achieve full integration, Asian Americans must surmount several barriers to the acculturation processes, such as language, knowledge about the American political system, and pervasive concern about economic security. Compared to a traditional non-Hispanic White household in which children pick up political cues from parental discussion about American politics, children in Asian American households do not hear much conversation about either American politics or general politics. Even if immigrant parents talk about political affairs, the topics are more likely related to politics in their homelands.[9] In short, much of the Asian American population is probably still adapting and adjusting.

[9] Interest in politics of homelands, however, is found to have positive impact on political participation in American politics (Junn et al. 2008).

Given their unique paths to the United States and distinct characteristics of the Asian American population, the first element of the project examines the influence of acculturation experiences and group identity on their political participation. Many of my expectations with respect to acculturation are commonsensical. The more adapted they are (for example, in the form of improved English proficiency), the more likely Asian Americans are to take part in the political system. In particular, I posit that acculturation experiences such as adapting to use English and interactions with other Asian Americans and non-Asian Americans help to connect individuals to a broader collective body. Whether this connection is forged by a sense of shared social position, culture, or prejudice, it helps to shape and/or update individuals' group identities in response to not only the present society but also the imagined communities and thus likely greater participation, especially when specific threat to the group is present.

Similarly, I expect group identity to play a major role in shaping Asian American political participation. More specifically, I posit that the identity that embraces one's American-ness as well as Asian-ness or her own ethnicity helps to elevate her possibility of voting. Similar to African American linked fate (Dawson 1994) and co-ethnic cues for Hispanic voters (Barreto 2010), "Asian American" or "ethnic American" (e.g., Chinese American) identity should have positive impact on Asian American political participation. The claim of American-ness entitles the individual's political rights, while the declaration of Asian-ness or ethnicity motivates the individual to act with the imagined community in mind. In short, the panethnic identity prompts individual Asian Americans to participate in politics.

If the above proposition is true, ethnic cues should be able to energize Asian American voters. The second major element of the project examines whether descriptive representation theory holds for Asian Americans. Descriptive representation theory predicts groups prefer to elect representatives who share similar sociological traits. The number of successfully elected Asian American officials at the federal level is limited:

only eight Asian American members served in the second session of the 110th Congress (Tong 2008).[10] Asian American candidates have been more successful in local elections in some heavily Asian suburban areas but the relevant universe of instructive cases is still somewhat limited (Lai 2011).[11] We do have enough evidence to begin to speculate on some relationships, however, and it is clear that political elites and party operatives face challenges in engaging Asian American voters.

If Asian Americans are motivated to participate politically by the presence of co-ethnics on the ballot, the parties might be tempted to promote such candidates, given the growing size of the Asian American electorate. As it stands now, low turnout levels mean that political parties lack motivation to appeal to Asian American voters (Kim 2007; Lee and Hajnal 2011). However, given the rapid growth of the Asian American population and the history of how political party system changes (Anderson 1979), both the Democratic and Republican Party will probably see Asian Americans as a tempted target to boost their fortunes if they think descriptive representation will draw them to the polls. Indeed, this is probably already occurring despite the absence of systematic evidence that descriptive representation is facilitates mobilization. For instance, Governor Nikki Haley caught attention at the 2011 RedState Gathering at Charleston, South Carolina, where her name was floated as a vice-presidential hopeful (Shahid 2011).

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10 Nine Asian Pacific Americans served in the first session of the 110th Congress: two Senators, six Representatives, and one Delegate. With the resignation of one Representative (Bobby Jindal won the gubernatorial election in Louisiana and sworn in as governor) at the beginning of the second session, eight Asian Pacific Americans served the 110th Congress. The eight Asian Pacific Americans are Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (Democrat, the non-voting delegate representing American Samoa's at-large district), Mazie Keiko Hirono (Democrat representing the 2nd congressional district of Hawaii), Michael M. Honda (Democrat representing the 15th congressional district of California), Bobby Jindal (Republican representing the 1st congressional district of Louisiana), Doris Okada Matsui (Democrat representing the 5th congressional district of California), Robert Cortez Scott (Democrat representing the 3rd congressional district of Virginia), David Wu (Democrat representing the 1st congressional district of Oregon), Daniel Kahikina Akaka (Democrat, Senator for Hawaii), and Daniel Ken Inouye (Democrat, Senator for Hawaii). http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-398.pdf (Last Date of Access: March 7, 2012)

11 Lai (2011) examines success and failure of Asian American candidates in city council elections and finds that in addition to the size of Asian American populations, ethnic-based organizations and media play critical roles in increasing candidates' visibility, coordinating and publicizing campaign activities.

To briefly restate the research plan, my empirical analyses have three components. First, I estimate the relationship between Asian American socioeconomic resources and their political participation by comparing their education, income, and turnout rates to other racial and ethnic groups. These comparisons make it clear how the conventional wisdom fails to explain Asian American political participation at the aggregate level. Second, I explore the causes of Asian American political participation by examining the impacts of acculturation experiences and group identity on turnout. Third and finally, I investigate the effect of ethnic cues on Asian American turnout, building upon descriptive representation theory.

In the next chapter, I first survey general theories of political participation and theories conceptualizing minority political participation. Building upon the existing literature, I outline the theoretical framework of the project and identify several working hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested in subsequent empirical chapters. The main argument, pursued throughout, is that the particular nature of the Asian American immigration experience emphasizes the role of acculturation and group identities—independent of socioeconomic status—on political participation. This insight provides a relevant blueprint for those seeking to increase Asian American turnout, as well as those interested in extending or refining democratic theories such as interest group liberalism.

CHAPTER TWO: Perspectives On Political Participation Among Asian Americans

Asian-American political participation is possibly the most complicated of all ethnic groups in the US. Asian Americans come from different countries; they speak different languages; and they arrived in different waves of immigration. And yet there is reason to think that these different groups are linked in some important way. Asians in America share some common elements, irrespective of their particular country of origin. This project treats this panethnic group as a whole, and seeks to understand the nature of voter turnout for this burgeoning population.

The factors affecting Asian-American political participation are more complex than those for other racial or ethnic groups in the United States. The conventional wisdom states that higher socioeconomic status (SES) will lead to a higher degree of political engagement. The better educated, on average, have better skills and are thus more likely to find higher-paying jobs. Skills and money, in turn, are critical resources for political power. However, the link between SES and political participation does not seem to hold for Asian Americans. In 2008, Asians earned the highest real median income ($65,637) among all racial groups, followed by non-Hispanic Whites ($55,530), Hispanics ($37,913), and Blacks ($34,213) (U.S. Census Bureau 2009a). Similarly, with regard to educational achievement, in 2008 more than half of Asians in the United States (53 percent) held at least a bachelor's degree, compared to 33 percent of non-Hispanic Whites, 20 percent of Blacks, and 13 percent of Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). Yet, in the 2008 presidential election, non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks showed the highest turnout rates among adult citizens (66 percent and 65 percent, respectively), compared with only half of Hispanics (50 percent) and Asians (48 percent) (U.S. Census Bureau n.d.). The question, then, is obvious: why does a relatively affluent and well-

educated group under-participate politically? A second, follow-up question is: what strategies will effectively energize Asian Americans to vote? The growing population of Asian Americans implies increasing political potential, but what steps must be taken to help Asian Americans achieve their "fair" share of political power?

Political participation is the cornerstone of democracy, and voting is its most basic and regular form. Participatory norms, however, are not necessarily ingrained in newcomers' minds. Given rapid demographic changes in the United States, a better understanding of how immigrants behave politically and the consequences of their behavior is vital. The conventional wisdom assumes that turnout and political participation are the results of individuals having the means (or skills) to overcome the costs of acting, and that socioeconomic status thus best explains political participation. This approach, however, is problematic when it comes to explaining the participation patterns of Asian immigrants and their descendants.

Relatively speaking, we know quite a bit about the political behavior of African Americans and Hispanics. The nature and causes of political participation among Asian Americans are not as well known. Indeed, the voting behavior of Asian Americans is one of the more intriguing puzzles of contemporary American politics. As suggested above, one would expect Asian Americans to vote and be active in politics, given their high levels of income and educational attainment relative to Latinos, African-Americans and Whites. Asian Americans, however, participate less than other racial and ethnic groups (Cho 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Ong and Scott 2009). This participation gap lessens the political significance of the current population growth rates of Asian Americans, while at the same time providing a lingering opportunity for parties and candidates seeking to boost their fortunes by mobilizing peripheral electorates (Andersen 1979).

The notion that political participation dynamics vary by racial groups is widely accepted, even as we begin to empirically examine the specific case of Asian Americans.

One obvious explanation for low turnout is the immigrant experience; but the nature of the experience is complex and evolving. The so-called fourth-wave of migration—disproportionately from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America—has transformed the racial and ethnic composition of the United States (Lee 2008). The residential patterns of these newcomers seem to have a significant impact on their political behavior as information flows through community networks, affecting political socialization experiences, and offering more or less encouragement for participation among new residents and their offspring in different locales (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006). In particular, residential dispersion decreases the size of immigrant communities and reduces the incentives for parties and candidates to woo these groups, diminishing their (political) power. This phenomenon has been especially acute among Asian American groups, leaving scholars grasping for ways to explain low levels of political engagement and participation.

Our lack of understanding is important given that Asian Americans are a burgeoning segment of the electorate, especially in states like California, New York, and Texas. Mobilizing immigrant groups is significant for improving democratic functioning in the U.S., as it is in many other democratic countries with sizable immigrant populations. For example, Germany has a large and diverse immigrant population. Moreover, its government has identified increased political participation of immigrants as an important policy target (Cyrus 2005). Since World War II, the immigration flow first to West Germany, and later into the unified Germany, was composed mainly of workers from southern Europe.[12] Although public authorities launched programs on federal, state and local levels to promote political participation among immigrants, these efforts

[12] During the same period, several ethnic Germans who previously resided in East Europe and Soviet Union flooded into Germany until 1993 its immigration has been limited to 220,000 per year. Ethnic Germans could immediately gain German citizenship upon arrival according to Article 116 of the Basic Law. They received much financial and social assistance to ease their integration into society: housing, vocational training, and many other types of assistance, even language training were liberally provided (Solsten 1996).

historically targeted ethnic Germans. Only recently have foreign immigrants been included in these special programs. A more significant policy declaration occurred when Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted the first National Integration Summit on July 14, 2006, which focused on how to move integration forward.[13] The Basic Law and a series of governmental actions underscored the importance of incorporating immigrants and their children into German society.

France presents a similar case of how immigration became part of the parties' political agenda (Schuerkens 2005). In France's case, the main immigration flow came from other European and African countries.[14] The underlying rationale for migration to France has changed from economics (better job opportunities) to politics (political asylum) over time.[15] This has produced strains, though, as the country has had to adapt to deal with an influx of unskilled labor. The 2006 immigration and integration law, for example, encouraged the migration of highly skilled workers and students, while the rules of family reunification and access to residence and citizenship were constricted and limited. Political participation among immigrant groups in France is generally quite low, and the larger question of how they will be incorporated into the party system is pressing (Schuerkens 2005).

This study is motivated by both an abiding interest in the engagement of minority groups in the political arena as well as a concern about the direction and competitive balance of the current party system. In this chapter, I consider existing explanations—especially the socioeconomic (SES) model—and then discuss what might explain Asian American turnout and participation, given what we know of other minority groups. I will

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[13] German Federal Ministry of Interior, http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Integration/NatIntegrationsplan/natIntegrationsplan_node.html. (last access date: November 01, 2010)

[14] Unlike Germany, migration was not only limited to the introduction of a labor force, but legal acts permitted families to migrate to France (Schuerkens 2005).

[15] Even when the United States introduced entry quotas in the 1920s, France continued to be open for laborers and persecuted people (Schuerkens 2005).

then discuss the empirical plan of the project. The chapter consists of three sections: first, I review the literature and develop a theoretical basis for the project; second, I outline the research design for each empirical chapter; third, I summarize the significance of the project, focusing on the potential of Asian American political participation in contemporary American politics.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW

The existing literature presents various perspectives that collectively offer a wide range of factors to account for political participation. Scholars generally argue that socioeconomic status (SES, i.e., some combination of income, education, and occupation) determines access to resources, and thus conditions an individual's participation in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The central tenet of the SES model is that people with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics. SES increases the opportunity to accumulate resources such as money and time, which translates into increased participation. These factors together are known as "the baseline model" of American political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 281). Regardless of the metrics used for "class," studies consistently demonstrate that higher-status individuals are more actively involved in politics (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 92).

While agreeing with the importance of SES for political participation, some scholars have questioned the means by which these two are linked. In unpacking the concept of SES, some argue that education has a greater impact on voting than income or occupation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Others have been more ambivalent (Verba and Nie 1972). This ambivalence may reflect the views of the architects of the SES model, which shows that the participant population is skewed in the direction of upper-status citizens, but does not explain which resources are contributory, nor how those resources are linked to political participation.

Individual resources can be grouped into three categories: time, money, and civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Civic skills explain the critical link between SES and political participation in the United States. The term "civic skills" refers to one's ability to express one's opinions freely and to work with others to achieve common interests. In a manner similar to income-levels, civic skills allow individuals to wield political influence over policy outcomes. In cultivating civic skills, education facilitates organization and communication skills, as well as a better understanding of the political system and political issues. More importantly, civic skills are usually acquired at an early age and possibly in non-political institutions (such as church) (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Kirlin 2003).

Civic skills, nevertheless, are not easy to measure directly and precisely. Civic engagement, however, provides a reasonable proxy (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Kirlin 2003). The argument is that participation in civic activities spurs the development of civic skills—both political and non-political. For racial and ethnic minorities, joining racial or ethnic organizations may thus aid the cultivation of civic skills, regardless of what type of identity the organizations embrace. These skills, in turn, become a valuable resource promoting political participation. In explaining participation, voting, and political discussion, Verba and his colleagues find that church attendance indeed has a significant impact on political participation (338, 352), which supports the idea of civic engagement as a proxy for civic skills and a driver of political participation.

With a greater emphasis on resources, the civic voluntarism model also incorporates the notions of "recruitment" and "mobilization" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Recruiting solicits political support while mobilizing activates previously inactive supporters (Aldrich 1997). Both help decrease the cost of participation and thus increase the willingness of individuals to take political action.[16] For instance, lower SES

[16] For the purpose of demonstration, "recruitment" and "mobilization" are treated as interchangeable in the project.

individuals rely on mobilization efforts by candidates and parties, and are especially responsive to ideology and group-based resources (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hill and Leighly 1996).[17] The logic is that party organizations and campaign workers, by providing information about candidates and voting, decrease the cost and increase the incentives for voters to cast ballots.[18] There is no doubt that party mobilization plays a key role in voter turnout and behavior, but the political socialization of an individual is perhaps even more critical.

Political socialization is the process by which individuals acquire and develop their own particular political orientations. It typically begins at an early age. Repeated exposure to political affairs triggers political learning and helps to define the meaning of important concepts. The information flowing around the dining table can explicitly or implicitly stimulate the desire of children in the family to understand its concepts. Based on social learning theory, children are rational actors who seek their parents' attention and learn from their parents' positive and negative feedback. Children who hear their parents talking about politics learn that being alert to the political world is important, and these children typically develop an interest in politics.[19]

In particular, if parents are highly politicized and over time provide consistent political cues, their children tend to adopt their parents' political orientations, even though political events, different family structures (e.g., single parent family or divorced household), and outside information may complicate the transmission of political orientations from parents to their offspring (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). With

[17] Hill and Leighly (1996) analyze 1978-1990 turnout rates by social class, state, and year and find that in presidential elections the more liberal and competitive the Democratic Party in a state, the greater the mobilization of lower-class voters, and the higher relative turnout of lower classes.
[18] Green and Gerber (2004), however, further point out that information itself is not enough to mobilize voters. Their field experiment results suggest that effective Get Out The Vote tactics should make voters feel wanted and invoke voters' personal motivations. In short, more personal contacts are better.
[19] Taking a slightly different view, some scholars emphasize the connection between children's communication with their parents and the children's learned understanding on the importance of political involvement (Erikson and Tedin 2006).

successful top-down political socialization, children are likely to continue their parents' political legacy.

In the political world, socialization plays a critical role in transforming available resources into actual influence on policy outcomes. Higher levels of education and income, though facilitating the acquisition of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), do not automatically become participatory assets (Cho 1999). It is through socialization that most people learn the means and value of political participation. In other words, people learn democratic values and civic norms from those close to them. These ideas of engaging in public affairs and processes are usually reinforced in school. Education increases the likelihood of learning these behaviors, but other socialization agents are equally, if not more, important. In addition, socialization experiences shape individuals' views of one's self and one's own groups.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS

General overviews of political participation usually focus on non-Hispanic White voters. Racial and ethnic minorities, however, often have different experiences than Whites. Scholars have developed several different theories for explaining political participation among racial and ethnic minorities. For example, group identity and group consciousness can be effective in motivating members of minority groups to vote. Group identity is a sense of membership, an objective inclusion (Huddy, 2003:513), along with a psychological attachment to a particular stratum (Miller, et al., 1981:495). When group identity is politically activated, the individual becomes conscious of the political gain and loss resulting from this identity. Such awareness is particularly heightened when an outside threat to the group is present. Therefore, group consciousness requires group identity and "a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's

interests" (Miller, et al., 1981:495).[20] Though group identity is a necessary condition for group consciousness, it is not sufficient to cause an individual to take action. In short, group identity is likely to influence the acquisition of information (Conover 1984:762-3), while group consciousness serves as a utility heuristic that helps interpret pieces of information (Conover 1985:141-3; Dawson 1994:61).

Given the significance of group affinity, researchers should be cautious about delineating the aspects of group identity that condition group members' voting behavior (Lee 2008). Two aspects of group identity should be highlighted. First, an individual can have multiple group identities. These identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but are assigned different degrees of salience in various contexts by the possessor (Cohen, 1999:14). For example, an African American with high socioeconomic status faces the cross-pressures of race and class.[21] Cross-pressured people are those with two or more social factors pushing their political preferences in different directions (Berelson et al., 1954:283). Those with contradictory political views tend to turn to their surroundings to seek cues (293). Therefore, the immediate context plays an important role in their decision-making process. Sometimes, these people are discouraged from political participation due to the inconsistency of preferences suggested by different race and class identities (Berelson et al., 1954, 284; Mutz, 2002, 838).[22]

Second, group identity, instead of being a fixed condition, is a fluid social construct that changes in response to one's immediate context (Huddy, 2001:134). Nevertheless, when group identity is strong, a change in context will have less impact on

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[20] Several scholars follow the same definitions: for example, Conover and Feldman, 1984:155, Stokes, 2003:363-4; Sanchez, 2006:438-9.

[21] From the view of African American linked fate (i.e., what happened to other African Americans in this country will have something to do with what happens in this individual's personal life), he or she is more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (Uhlaner et al., 1989; Dawson, 1994; Leighley, 2001). On the other hand, based on his or her socioeconomic status, the person is more likely to identify with the Republican Party.

[22] On the other hand, a combination of multiple identities may also reinforce the tendency to act if those identities point toward the same preference/outcome.

the individual (147). When a group identity is highly stable, the intergroup boundary is more rigid, and group identity serves as a powerful political heuristic (145). On the other hand, this rigid group boundary also constrains the possibility of extending the boundary to form a larger coalition that includes other racial and ethnic minority groups (Kaufmann 2003a, 200). Indirectly, rigid group boundaries limit minority political empowerment to a fragmented, group-specific political empowerment.

As suggested above, group identity is related to (though distinct from) the concept of political empowerment, which is "the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making" (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 378). Though Black empowerment has had a significant positive impact on Blacks' sociopolitical participation, this does not hold true for non-Black minority groups. Symbolic rewards of minority empowerment are fairly group-specific (Kaufmann 2003b).[23] This implies that enhanced group-specific engagement (specifically, the higher turnout rates) is not likely to be shared by other groups. For instance, Black empowerment may not be relevant for understanding the political orientation of Mexican Americans (or Asian Americans) in Los Angeles (Gilliam 1996, 76).[24]

Social and political scientists have systematically examined political representation among African Americans, Hispanics, and females in the past decades. The passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 unlocked the door of political power to racial minorities. Although there has been an increase in the number of African American elected officials, African Americans remain politically underrepresented (Barker, Jones, and Tate 1999; Walton and Smith 2003). The paucity of African American elected officials can be partially attributed to the reluctance of White voters to elect African American candidates (Terkildsen 1993), and partially to factors such as the candidates'

[23] Kaufmann (2003b) analyzed four mayoral elections (1983-2003) in Denver, Colorado in which the first Latino, and subsequently the first Black, mayor were elected.
[24] Gilliam's analysis (1996) is based on the 1990 Southern California Social Survey data.

ideology and electability (Tate 2003). In other words, an African American candidate in an African American district does not guarantee an electoral victory.

Nonetheless, in order to get elected, African American candidates need overwhelming support from African American voters (Adler 2001). Vote choice aside, the appearance of African American candidates' names on the ballot slightly increases turnout among African Americans (Gay 2001). The underlying mechanism is that African Americans hold more positive views of African American candidates than Whites (Tate 1993).[25]

Similar results have been observed among Hispanics and women (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen 1995; Sapiro and Conover 1997). A growing population of Hispanics in a district increases the turnout among Hispanic voters and enhances the chance that a Hispanic representative candidate gets elected (Welch and Hibbing 1984). Studies on female representation, however, show more variation. While some scholars find that female candidates are more appealing to and can energize female voters (Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen 1995; Sapiro and Conover 1997; Philpot and Walton 2007), some argue that conditions such as issue salience (Paolino 1995), individual candidate characteristics (Ekstrand and Eckert 1981), or race (Sigelman and Welch 1984) have an interactive impact with gender on vote decisions.

ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Since President Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act (a.k.a., Hart-Celler Immigration Act) into law in 1965, a massive influx of immigrants from Asian countries have entered the United States. The legislation phased out the strict national origins quota system first imposed in 1921. Race-based quotas were no longer in effect,

[25] Using the 1984 National Black Election Study, Tate (1993) finds that African Americans rated Jesse Jackson more favorably than Whites. However, other scholars contend that African American support for African American candidates conditions on individual voters' ideologies (Griffin and Keane 2006).

but were instead replaced by nationality-based quotas. In addition to newcomers from Latin America and the West Indies, immigrants from Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, India, Iran, the Philippines, and other countries surpassed the 100,000 people level during the second half of the twentieth century (Fiorina, Peterson, Johnson, and Mayer 2010). According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the top countries of origin for naturalization were (in the following order): Mexico, India, Philippines, China and Vietnam in 2009.[26] In light of this, scholars have gradually turned their attention to Asian Americans (Cho 1999; Chang 2001; Nakanishi and Lai 2003; C.J. Kim 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Wong 2006; T. Kim 2007; Aoki and Takeda 2008; Lai 2011; Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, and Junn 2011).

This attention has uncovered at least one uncontrovertible fact: the aforementioned participation models may not be entirely reasonable or appropriate for explaining Asian American behavior. Unlike African Americans who share a collective memory of slavery, unlike Hispanics who mostly share the common language of Spanish, and unlike both African Americans and Hispanics who on average have a lower SES level than Whites, Asians in the United States present a peculiar case.[27] Perhaps more to the point, "immigrants who travel through separate socialization channels may have a very different cost and benefit structure from native-born Americans" (Cho 1999, 1144). Facing a dramatic change in living environment, it takes time (sometimes several generations) to learn the meanings and norms of the host society, and to find and define their own place and role—whether it is acquired (Tse 1999; Kiang 2001) or ascribed (Kim 2000).

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[26] "Naturalization Fact Sheet" is available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b62aef6b56c1b210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD (Last date of access: March 15, 2012).

[27] For instance, Claire Kim (1999) argues that Asian Americans are racially triangulated and situated outside the existing Whites-Blacks racial order.

Despite the ethnic diversity within the Asian community, there is sufficient reason to treat different Asian ethnicities as similar in the present study. Though they do not share the same language, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Japanese all embrace hierarchical family structures and share some cultural reference points. In addition, all Asian subgroups encounter similar acculturation experiences. For example, the language barrier is a major obstacle for virtually all Asians to fully integrate into American society (except, of course, for Filipinos and Indians). I therefore assume the phrase "Asian American" has some associative meaning for the groups lumped under this heading, even as I acknowledge the considerable differences between and among Asian nationalities.

In this study, I argue that the SES model and mobilization theory fail to explain Asian American participation at the group level. Given their relatively high levels of socioeconomic resources in the aggregate, one would expect Asian Americans to be the most participatory in the country; however, this is not borne out in reality. In contrast, I suggest that current low levels of participation among Asian Americans largely reflect their political acculturation experiences, which shape their views of themselves: whether they see themselves as part of the American society and/or political system, and to what extent they identify with any major racial and ethnic community in the U.S. In other words, Asian American political participation is driven by distinct acculturation and socialization experiences, which affect the individual's sense of group identity. This assumption implies that intermediate factors exist but have been neglected in earlier analyses.

Similarly, mobilization theory falls short in explaining Asian American participation in two ways. First, Asian Americans have not yet effectively garnered attention from the two major parties (Kim 2007; Hajnal and Lee 2011). Second, successful get-out-the-vote efforts that would translate Asian American SES into political force depend on empowered community-based political organizations and active ethnic

press (Wong 2004). These organizations and press outlets are sporadically and unevenly distributed across the country.

In addition, several confounding theories stand out. Though some may argue that transnational ties to politics of homelands may distract immigrants from integrating into the host society, scholars find evidence supporting the opposite. Those who are more involved or interested in politics of their homelands, as a matter of fact, are also more likely to participate in American politics (Junn et al. 2008). In addition, while political information and (external and internal) efficacy are positively related to voting (Lassen 2005; Finkel 1985; Tolbert and Mcneal 2003), I consider these concepts more as products of acculturation, rather than part of the acculturation process. This is not to say that these factors have no influence on Asian American political participation, but for the sake of simplicity in the present study,[28] I thus focus on the impact of acculturation on participation.

ACCULTURATION AND SOCIALIZATION EXPERIENCES AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS

Acculturation is "the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members." In particular, at the individual level, acculturation involves "changes in a person's behavioral repertoire" (Berry 2005, 698-699). Put another way, acculturation refers to the degree to which one adapts to the present environment. Through acculturation, individuals experience collision and negotiation between the pre-existing culture from their homelands and the present culture embraced by the host society, an ongoing process that leads to adaptation and adjustment.

[28] For example, political efficacy and political participation may have reciprocal effect on each other (Finkel 1985).

On the other hand, political socialization relates to experiences that transmit political orientation and values from parents to their children (Merelman 1986, 279).[29] In general, the first and most important socialization agent one encounters is one's parents. For immigrant families, however, the socialization process is not always top-down, from parents to children, but sometimes actually reverses the direction (Wong and Tseng 2008). What happens in high-status Anglo households may not take place in high-status Asian households. And to the extent the process is top-down, many immigrant parents contribute to the political learning process of their children primarily through discussions about politics in their country of origin, rather than about American politics (Wong and Tseng 2008).

Although a comprehensive study of Asian American political participation requires some understanding of socialization processes, my focus here is on acculturation rather than socialization. Partly, this is practical. Socialization processes are almost impossible to observe and relying on recall measures to estimate relationships is fraught with peril. Partly, however, it is theoretical. The majority of Asian Americans are naturalized and acculturation seems a more relevant and interesting target if we are to advance our broader knowledge of Asian American turnout.

What do we know about acculturation and politics among Asian Americans? A few basic facts stand out. Among the Hispanic and Asian communities in the United States, the major hurdles for stepping into the political world are often the language barrier (Cho 1999) and nativity (Cho 1999; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Ong and Scott 2009). With limited English proficiency, some may not fully understand the political system or know where to turn for help. In order to participate in politics, immigrant parents sometimes rely on their offspring—whose native tongue is English—for help (Wong and Tseng 2008).

[29] While scholars focus on various aspects of socialization, Merelman's definition of political socialization is the most widely accepted (Sigel 1995).

On the other hand, being surrounded by people with similar questions, needs, and motivations could actually facilitate political discussion and raise political awareness within the community. Thus, while residential concentration might impede the assimilation and acculturation processes in some ways, in other ways it might facilitate the flow of political information and enhance residents' political knowledge (Cho, Gimpel and Dyck 2006).

To be clear, nativity itself is not the cause of low participation among Asian Americans; rather it suggests unique acculturation (for immigrants) and socialization (for their offspring) processes. Facing even more obstacles to political participation than the native-born, immigrants come with different cultural and political backgrounds. The classical liberalism and ethos of individualism underlying American constitutional democracy may not be familiar to new arrivals (Lien, Conway and Wong 2004). Conversely, U.S.-born Asian Americans do not struggle with the language and have been immersed in American political culture, and are thus more likely to become more politically active. Indeed, the behavioral patterns of those who have been in the U.S. for a longer period (for example, more than ten years) approximate those of the native-born (Ong and Scott 2009).[30] Nevertheless, socialization experiences of U.S.-born Asian Americans may lack the content of American politics due to their parents' limited repertoire.

[30] Surprisingly, Ong, Cruz-Viesca and Nakanishi (2008) found that naturalized Asian American citizens voted more than native-born Asian Americans in the 2006 midterm election (after accounting for margin of errors), using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2006 November Current Population Survey (CPS). It is arguably possible that the naturalized Asians are at least politically active or interested enough to acquire their citizenship. A lack of evidence in this regard begs for additional data on the acculturation experiences among Asian immigrants and socialization experiences of the second and later generation Asian Americans.

ASIAN AMERICAN GROUP IDENTITY

A sense of connection to a broader collective community and group consciousness from either personally experiencing discrimination or perceiving persecution or threats to the interests of one's racial or ethnic group may engender panethnic identification as a strategic response to the coercive forces (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Masuoka and Rim 2007). In other words, personal experiences or the perception of discrimination due to one's race or ethnicity are key to a panethnic identity formation (Dawson 1994; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004). A panethnic identity—such as African Americans, Native American Indians, Hispanics, and Asian Americans— is a socially constructed label applied (or ascribed) to different groups with various cultural traditions and languages (Espiritu 1992). Racial discrimination can effectively activate group consciousness, which increases political involvement (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Masuoka and Rim 2007).[31] Supportive evidence has been found among African Americans (Dawson 1994) and Hispanics (Sanchez 2006), but how group identity for a highly diverse community, such as Asian Americans, affect group members' participation is little known.

Group identity engenders the social and cultural positions with which one has chosen to identify.[32] While some Asians integrate or assimilate into the mainstream and embrace their "American" identity, some choose instead to identify themselves as

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[31] Using the 2004 *Survey of Asians in the Bay Area* data, Masuoka and Rim (2007) find that Asian Americans (both foreign born and U.S.-born) who experienced first-hand discrimination or perceive discrimination against Asians as a problem in preventing Asians from succeeding were indeed more likely to prefer Asian American candidates.

[32] Some may contend that transnational ties between immigrants and their homelands may delay the acculturation process and thus prevent members of ethnic groups from integrating into the host society, resulting in lower levels of political participation (Zhou 2001, 199; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004, 21). Empirical evidence, nevertheless, shows otherwise (Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Junn et al. 2008). Using the 2001-2001 five-metropolitan area data sets, Lien, Conway and Wong (2004) surprisingly found that neither prior participation in homeland politics, nor the interest and attention paid to homeland politics supported such a theoretical expectation. More recently, Junn et al. (2008) found that those who participated in their homelands were more likely to vote in the United States. One plausible explanation relies on the immigrants' previous socialization experiences in their countries of origin. Those who valued political participation are more likely to carry that belief from their homelands to the United States and to continue to practice it.

"Asian" or "ethnic only" (e.g., "Chinese," or "Vietnamese"), and still others respond to the changing identity by creating a hybrid identity, such as "Chinese American", or, more broadly, "Asian American". Those who see themselves primarily as "American" may behave similar to members of the host society, while those who see themselves in more ethnic terms, such as "Korean", may withdraw from American politics.

I argue that identities acknowledging both their ancestral culture and their American-ness by connecting individuals to the collective community, which encourages them to participate in American politics. First, their American-ness reflects their (desires) to integrate into American society, in part by exercising their political rights and civic duties. Connecting to one's own Asian or ethnic culture ties the individual to a broader minority community, a collective body; the sense of connectedness as well as her hybrid identity impress upon her the needs of the group. The absence of either elements of an "Asian (or ethnic) American" identity (i.e., "American" only or "Asian" only) can weaken the motivation to participate politically.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Three hypotheses emerge from this discussion:

First, the better acculturated and those who primarily identify as "Asian American" or "ethnic American" (such as "Chinese American") are more likely to vote.

Acculturation experiences and group identity play important role in political participation. The better acculturated tend to be aware of their political rights, civic obligation, and means by which they can participate. Thus the better acculturated are more likely to participate in the electoral process. Identities acknowledging one's both American-ness and Asian-ness or ethnicity help to connect individuals to a broader but still limited community, and thus more likely to motivate Asian American voters to turnout. Their self-identified American-ness indicates them seeing themselves as party of

the political system, and the acknowledged Asian-ness or ethnicity helps to motivate them to act with a possible reference to the group's needs and interests. While the underlying mechanism of what is activated by which element of their identity, or under what circumstances one primarily sees herself as "Asian American" or "ethnic American", or merely "American" is beyond the scope of this project, if the aforementioned reasoning is true for Asian Americans, those who view themselves as "Asian American" or "ethnic American" will be more likely to vote.

Second, the better acculturated Asian Americans are more likely to identify themselves as "Asian American" or "ethnic American."

As suggested above, the better acculturated Asian Americans are aware of changes in their surrounding environment, incorporate these changes in their behavior repertoire, and adapt to their new positions in the society (Berry 2005). If this were true for Asian Americans, the increased level of acculturation will lead to their embracement of American-ness as well as their Asian-ness or ethnicity. The adoption of American-ness in their identity implies their longing to be accepted in American society, indirectly acknowledging their inclusion of the political system, whereas the choice of Asian-ness or ethnicity implies their recognition of difference from the majority. Although the ethnic boundary may fade away over time and generations (Takaki 1989), the (pan-)ethnic categorization helps to foster a sense of belonging to a broader but unique community. As a result, the better acculturated Asian Americans are predicted to be more likely to view themselves as "Asian American" or "ethnic Americans."

Third, Asian Americans who feel a sense of connectedness to the Asian American community are more likely to identify as "Asian American."

The need for relations among human beings urges individuals to connect to communities, regardless of time, location, race, and ethnicity. Those who perceive commonality with members of a particular group are more likely to feel connected to that community. As a result, this sense of connection helps individuals to identify with the

group and possibly act upon the group's interests. Thus, Asian Americans who feel connected to the Asian American community are likely to identify as "Asian American." In addition, those who feel connected to other Asians may also primarily identify as "ethnic American."[33]

Fourth, those who experience racial and ethnic discrimination are more likely to acknowledge their uniqueness (such as Asian-ness or ethnicity) in their identity.

Racial and ethnic discrimination experiences are likely to activate one's identity against which the individual is held prejudices (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Incidents of racial and ethnic discrimination also facilitate the recognition of individuals' differences from the mainstream as well as similarities with groups that share the specific trait. Therefore, racial and ethnic discrimination experiences among Asian Americans are predicted to have a positive impact on identifying with their own Asian-ness or ethnicity.

Studies on group identity formation emphasize the process of acquiring a social identity related to group affinity, but little is known about how Asian American voters would react to Asian American candidates (except for Cho 2003; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Collet 2005; Masuoka and Rim 2007; Lai 2011; Wong et al. 2011).[34] Many expect that an in-group candidate (i.e., an Asian American candidate) will effectively energize the Asian community; however, the literature presents little direct empirical evidence of this phenomenon.

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[33] While it is possible that those who interpret "other Asians" in ethnic term (e.g., Chinese respondents perceive "other Asians" as "other Chinese") are more likely to identify as "ethnic American," the data is limited in this regard of testing how individuals perceive the term used in the questionnaire, as well as the underlying mechanism or reasoning why one identifies as "Asian American" or "ethnic American."

[34] Lien and her colleagues found that a majority of the sample in their Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001, preferred an Asian American candidate when both candidates were equally qualified for the office, and among those, 14% would still vote for the Asian American candidate even if (s)he were less qualified. In their analysis, however, descriptive representation was not systematically examined. More recently, Masuoka and Rim find that foreign-born Asian Americans in Bay Area were more likely to support an Asian American candidate than their native-born counterparts. In addition, they found that for the foreign-born, those who perceived panethnic commonality among Asians preferred the Asian American candidate. For the native-born, while those who believed that the achievements of Asians gained too little public recognition preferred the Asian American candidate, those who shared a sense of minority group commonality (not panethnic commonality) were *less* likely to prefer Asian American candidates.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF ASIAN AMERICANS

Political representation, symbolic or substantive, nowadays remains a major political goal for minorities.[35] Sometimes, the pathway to claim a sense of belonging is through political power, making their political voices heard (Rustin 1971, 118; Kiang 2001). Descriptive representation refers to the preference of groups to elect representatives with similar traits, while substantive representation refers to the group's policy preferences being represented in the decision-making process, regardless of the officials' racial and ethnic backgrounds.[36] While I am interested in how Asian American elected officials reflect the attitudes and behaviors of Asian Americans in the policy-making process (i.e., substantive representation), the relatively small number of elected Asian American officials at the national level makes it difficult to examine this dynamic. I therefore focus on descriptive (or symbolic) representation in the present study. In the case of Asian Americans, the question becomes, "Are Asian American voters more responsive to candidates with Asian backgrounds?", or "Can Asian American candidates effectively energize Asian voters?" While investigating the effect of ethnic cues among Asians, one may also ask, "Do the ethnic cues operate universally among individual Asian voters?"

It is important to reiterate the difference between political empowerment and descriptive representation theory. Scholars of political empowerment emphasize not only political representation (symbolic or substantive), but also substantial influence of the group in decision-making process (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 378). While both theories consider race and ethnicity as contextual cues of likely policy responsiveness that encourages voters of that group to value participation, political empowerment is more as

[35] In the present study, I use descriptive representation interchangeably with symbolic representation.
[36] Pitkin (1967) defines substantive representation, in contrast to descriptive or symbolic representation, as representation linked with activities enacted *for* the represented.

the consequence of descriptive (Pantoja and Segura 2003)[37] and substantive representation. In this project, I focus on descriptive representation instead of political empowerment.

To examine whether descriptive representation theory holds universally for Asian Americans, I test two hypotheses:

First, Asian American voters turn out at higher rates when an Asian American candidate contests the office, especially when (a) the Asian American candidate is coethnic (meaning that the candidate and the voter are of the same ethnicity), and/or (b) the Asian American candidate's ethnic tie is long standing or generational.

Ethnic cues influence voters' decisions because voters use available cues to infer more about the candidate. For example, seeing an Asian American candidate leads the voter to feel that the candidate is probably similar to herself, or to infer that the candidate values what the voter values, or shares the voter's interests and needs.

Second, racial and ethnic cues operate with particular effectiveness among those who were previously less engaged in politics.

These cues, however, can be more influential among those who are less informed or engaged in politics. After all, people only react to political events to the extent that they are aware of political affairs (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). More to the point, Popkin (1994) and Lupia (1994) demonstrate that most voters do not have a consistent and sophisticated political ideology, and therefore rely on shortcuts when asked to register an opinion about politics. If voters do not have sufficient information to make a decision, racial and ethnic cues will come in especially handy, but for those who are more politically engaged, racial and ethnic backgrounds are merely one more piece of factual information. In other words, if this were true, the lack of ethnic cues for Asian American voters may have contributed to their low turnout rate.

[37] For instance, in order to measure the effect of political empowerment on individual political orientation or behavior for a particular group, that group should have already successfully elected one of their own to offices.

In summary, I propose that the lower levels of political participation among Asian Americans result from their acculturation experiences and their views of self. Although Asian Americans are the fastest growing group in the United States, the strength in their numbers does not correspond to higher political participation. Descriptive representation predicts the effectiveness of racial and ethnic cues in energizing Asian voters. I further argue that the impact of ethnic cues depends on the level of previous political engagement. In the next section, I outline the data collection methods and empirical analysis used in this research.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

I first examine the relationship between socioeconomic status and turnout rates by race and ethnic origin at the group level (Chapter Three). As mentioned earlier, turnout rates are strongly influenced by education and income levels among non-Hispanic Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics, but not among Asian Americans at the aggregate level. To understand the uniqueness of Asian American participation in the United States, I outline the political structure that regulates their entrance, followed by a historical description of the contours of Asian American turnout rates, using the 2000 U.S. Census data and the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008.

The Census and the CPS data, which include basic demographics such as detailed educational attainment and family income levels, gender, and citizenship attainment, allow me to draw comparisons of these variables across major racial and ethnic groups. The empirical aggregate estimation of Asian American turnout shows the disconnect between the theoretical predictions of Asian American political participation and reality by comparing socioeconomic status and turnout rates for Asian Americans and other racial and ethnic groups, with a focus on the 2008 presidential election cycle. While the socioeconomic status model does not hold for the aggregate pattern among Asian

Americans, at the individual level it is the case that the more educated and the wealthier Asian Americans are more likely to vote than the less educated and the poor, especially among the U.S.-born Asian Americans. In other words, the issue is not only the intercept but also the slope (the effect of socioeconomic status on political participation). Even though there is an increasing public and scholarly interest in Asian Americans, Asian American turnout still lagged behind non-Hispanic Whites and African Americans. The continual population growth as well as the disjoint between theories of Asian political participation and turnout clearly call for further investigation.

Chapter Four explores the impact of acculturation experiences on group identity and turnout using the Pilot of National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) data conducted by Lien, Conway, and Wong in 2000-2001 in the metropolitan areas of Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco, using telephone interviews (N=1,218). The PNAAPS was the first large-n Asian American sample collected that included several variables considered important in conventional explanations of political participation. Residency and language use serve as proxy measures of acculturation experiences. In addition, specific questions pertaining to shared fate with other Asians, shared culture, and discrimination experiences measure a sense of group connectedness that facilitates the formation of "Asian American" or "ethnic American" identity. To analyze the effect of acculturation on group identity and turnout, as well as the effect of group identity on turnout, I also control for important demographics such as birthplace (nativity or U.S. born status), ethnicity, age, education, income, gender, and strength of partisanship.

Furthermore, to gain insight into Asian American acculturation experiences and group identity, I conducted fifteen in-depth interviews with Asian American voters, elites, and activists in the Austin area in Texas. Participants were recruited through a snowball sampling method, relying on references from initial contacts. On average, each interview lasted ninety minutes or so. The interviews not only supplement the empirical

analysis of Chapter Four, but also inform an original survey-based experiment that tested the effect of racial and ethnic cues on Asian American participation.

Seeking to fill a gap in the existing research on political representation and participation, Chapter Five examines the extent to which the descriptive representation theory holds for Asian American voters, using data from an original survey-based experiment. In this experiment, I presented a hypothetical city council campaign to survey respondents, manipulating two things in the script. The first-level treatment involved varying the nationality of the candidate. The second-level treatment involved identifying the country of origin of the candidate's parents, with an eye towards increasing the connection of the candidate to any underlying sense of connection with the "home" country. In the control group, two candidates with common American names were presented to participants. After the statement, participants were asked to report the likelihood of voting if the election were held tomorrow. Participants were recruited through on-campus flyers, and server lists associated with Asian Americans (such as the Center of Asian American Studies, Asian Round Table, Vietnamese Students Association, Asian American Campus Ministry, and other Asian fraternity and sorority groups). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five groups. Upon completion of the survey, respondents were each given $10 compensation for their time and effort. An independent pilot study confirmed the random assignment and manipulation check.

Last, Chapter Six revisits the puzzle that motivates the project, questions addressed, arguments proposed, and hypotheses tested in the study with a summary of major findings. Finally, I conclude the study by presenting an agenda for future research and suggestions for political behavior and racial and ethnic politics.

MOVING FORWARD

In this chapter I have examined a variety of common explanations for political participation as they apply to Asian Americans, and developed research hypotheses for understanding how acculturation processes affect group identity, which conditions participation. Specifically, I propose that political participation among Asian Americans results from their acculturation experiences and their views of selves. To energize Asian voters, descriptive representation predicts the effectiveness of racial and ethnic cues. This impact of ethnic cues, however, is contingent on the level of one's previous political engagement. These hypotheses, if true, would represent a major step forward in our ability to explain and predict immigrant group participation.

CHAPTER THREE: Asian American Political Participation In The Twenty-First Century

"Although their socioeconomic profile compares to that of whites in California, Asian turnout still lags that of whites by more than 20 percentage points, about the same percentage as the Latino turnout deficit."—"When the Sleeping Giant is Awake," Jack Citrin, California Journal, 2002 (December).

As the "awakening giant" metaphor used by scholars (Citrin 2002; Ong, Cruz-Viesca, and Nakanishi 2008) and the media (Reang 2000) indicates Asian American political involvement is slowly on the rise. Though Asian voters as a whole rarely catch the attention of the national media, their residential concentration in certain regions and states occasionally draws the local media spotlight. As often as not, this attention is because of unexpected behavior or results. For instance, the striking support for Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic primary in California from Asian voters (71 percent),[38] the electoral victories of three Chinese Americans in Supervisory Board Elections in San Francisco (MSNBC 2009),[39] and the more general success of Asian American candidates in at-large municipal elections (Lai 2011).

As a consequence of these and other results, scholars have started to disentangle contextual effects on Asian American political action. Outside of California, turnout rates among Asian Americans (specifically, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Indians) decrease as the percentages of co-ethnic immigrants in the neighborhoods increase, especially where Asians are geographically concentrated (Cho, Gimpel and Dyck 2006). Context is therefore particularly shaped by the local native-born and immigrant populations—these populations constrain the information flow and thus greatly affect political communication in these locations. This spatial dependence also exists in the form of

[38] Results of MSNBC exit poll at California (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21225970/) (Last date of access: April 23, 2010)
[39] "Asian-American Political Profile Rising in U.S." (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28721167/) (Last date of access: October 6, 2006)

ethnic campaign contribution networks (Cho 2003). For example, Asian Americans in the Pacific States deliver significantly more than their share in campaign contributions. By contrast, Asian Americans in Northeast States are much less invovled.

Such spatial patterns also exist over time in registration and voting. Asian voters in the West,[40] compared to other regions, were more active in the 2008 presidential race (File and Crissey 2010). The registration rate of the Asian voters in the West was 60 percent, followed by the Midwest (58 percent), the South (52 percent), and the Northeast (46 percent). With respect to voting, Asian voters in the West (53 percent) and Midwest (48 percent) reportedly voted at the highest levels, while the South (43 percent) and Northeast (40 percent) were lower.[41]

This chapter documents the disconnection between Asian American socioeconomic status and their political participation. Specifically, I address the following questions: To what degree is Asian turnout lower than that of other racial and ethnic groups in the twenty-first century? Is there any pattern to Asian American turnout over time?

I focus on the most contemporary election cycles (2000-2008) for two reasons. First, the Office of Management and Budget in 1997 announced new standards for racial classification in Census due to the prominent changes in the population's racial and ethnic makeup since 1977. For the sake of consistency, I therefore focus on turnout levels by racial and ethnic groups since 2000. Second, upon the execution of the study, the

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[40] Regions are defined by the Census Bureau as following: West includes Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) and Pacific States (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington); Midwest includes East North Central States (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and West North Central States (Iowa, Kansa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota); South includes South Atlantic States (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia), East South Central States (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee), and West South Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); Northeast includes New England States (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).

[41] The report on "Registration and Voting in the Election of November 2008" is available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf. (Last date of access: March 21, 2012).

Current Population Survey made information on self-reported voting and registration by demographics available for 2000 and beyond, but not before.

To answer my substantive questions, I compare Asian registration and turnout rates to those of other racial and ethnic groups. In particular, I take a closer look at the relationships between demographics and turnout rates by race and ethnicity in the 2008 presidential election cycle. These comparisons show the disconnection between Asian American political participation and the expectation based on their education and income levels. They also show a slight upward trajectory for Asian American political participation. But while Asian turnout—similar turnout among non-Hispanic Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics—shows a marginal increase over time, the turnout gaps among racial and ethnic groups persist. This gap, at the individual level, exists not only in the intercepts, but also the slopes (magnitudes of education and income effects on turnout) across racial and ethnic groups in the 2008 presidential election cycle. Comparisons of registration and voting rates also demonstrate that registration poses a significant challenge to Asians and Hispanics with respect to translating their numerical strength into political power. To understand the causes of the participation gap and the potential for change, I begin by outlining the political structure of immigration in the United States.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Immigration laws impose powerful structural forces upon those seeking to enter the United States (Haney López 1996, 39; Ngai 2004, 5). The interactions between existing residents and newly arrivals result in the public's acceptance of or resistance against newcomers. In response to public sentiments, the government regulates who can enter the country and how they may do so. Regarding Asians, regulations often have involved institutionalized discrimination.

The first Asian group to migrate to the U.S. in large number was the Chinese, due to a constant demand for Chinese labor in railroad construction, agriculture, and manufacturing (Takaki 1998, 28). The growing Chinese population in the United States, however, began to pose a threat to the native-born working laborers, particularly during the 1870s, when the Far West was experiencing tremendous economic hardship. The resulting social tension eventually convinced the U.S. Congress to restrict the legal entrance of Chinese laborers (111).

The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act suspended Chinese immigrant laborers from entering the country, and later the 1917 Immigration Act created "an Asiatic barred Zone," which prohibited all Asians from immigrating to the United States (Haney López 1996, 37-38). The complete exclusion of Asians was softened by the 1924 Immigration Act, which differentiated people by nationality and ranked them in a hierarchy of desirability (Ngai 1999). This effectively created a restrictive quota system targeting Asians. In fact, the severe entrance barriers for Asians were not appreciably loosened until 1965 (Wong 2006, 20).

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act, replaced the national origins quota system with a preference system that focused on three categories: skilled professionals, family reunifications, and political refugees. As a result, post-1965 immigrants largely consisted of non-Europeans, particularly Latin Americans and Asians with profession skills or relations in the U.S. Consequently, more recent immigrants (especially Asians) are relatively better educated and wealthier than their precedents (Lai 2011).

Today, the dominant characteristic of the Asian American population is its rapid growth. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the racial diversity of the United States has become more pronounced in the last few decades, as the number and percentage of immigrants from non-European countries has increased drastically since 1970. Between 1970 and 1980, Asian and Pacific Islanders were the nation's fastest-growing population,

with a rate of increase of 128 percent (from 1.5 million in 1970 to 3.5 million in 1980).[42] Entering the twenty-first century, Asians continue to be the fastest growing population in the nation.[43] Between 2000 and 2010, the Asian alone population grew faster than any other racial and ethnic group, increasing by 43 percent (from 10.2 million in 2000 to 14.7 million in 2010). Their numerical change is only next to the Hispanic population (from 35.5 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010).[44]

This demographic shift has the potential to dramatically alter the American political climate (Judis and Teixeira 2002), leaving Asian Americans as a powerful constituency group (Espiritu 1992, 54). This is particularly true in the western states, where one-half of Asian Americans reside, usually in the metropolitan areas (Reeves and Bennett 2003), but increasingly in suburban areas (Lai 2011). According to the 2008 Census estimates of the resident population by race and Hispanic origin, the states with the highest percentage of Asians are Hawaii (39.3 percent), California (12.5 percent), New Jersey (7.7 percent), New York (7.0 percent), and Washington (6.7 percent).[45] At the local level, New York, Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco, and Honolulu[46] were ranked as the five metropolitan areas with the largest Asian populations in 2000 (Barnes and Bennett 2002). The suburbanization of the Asian American population (Lai 2011) is driven by higher-ranked school districts, affordable housing, and pre-existing social networks. These areas also provide a more fertile ground to realize political

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[42] "We the Americans: Asians" (September, 1993) (http://www.census.gov/apsd/wepeople/we-3.pdf) (Last date of access: April 23, 2010). Race Data on Asian and Pacific Islanders (http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/ppl-184.html) (Last date of access: April 23, 2010)

[43] "National Population Projections," Jennifer Cheeseman Day (http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/natproj.html) (Last date of access: July 27, 2011)

[44] "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010" by Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. Ramirez, March 2011 (http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf). (Last date of access: March 30, 2012)

[45] State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States (Asian Population Alone, Percent) July 2008 (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/ranks/rank08.html) (Last date of access: July 27, 2011). Compared to the 2000 Census data, Asian alone population in the continental United States has grown in the four states: California (10.9 percent in 2000), New Jersey (5.7 percent), New York (5.5 percent), and Washington (5.5 percent) (Barnes and Bennett 2002).

[46] Honolulu is a census designated place and is not legally incorporated.

representation, although little is known about the causes and political consequences of Asian American suburbanization.[47]

THE STRENGTH OF NUMBER BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN

The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a "monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics."[48] Its primary goal is to describe the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. The voting supplement used here does not, unfortunately, provide estimates of partisanship. Both measurements of registration and voting are self-reported.

Voting in the United States is a two-step process: registration and turnout. Population size is only a precursor, as only citizens are allowed to cast votes. In 2008, citizens comprised 91 percent of the voting age population. The rates of adult citizens to voting-age population vary remarkably by race and ethnicity. For example, 98 percent of voting age non-Hispanic Whites ("Whites" in the following) are citizens, as are 94 percent of voting-age Blacks. For Hispanics and Asians,[49] the percentages are 63 percent and 68 percent, respectively. The percentages for the entire U.S. population, Whites, and Blacks remained stable from 2000 to 2008 (Figure 3-1), while the percentage for Hispanics varied but without a discernible trend. Note that only the percentage among Asians increased, growing from 59 percent in 2000 to 68 percent in 2008, and even surpassing that of Hispanics. The change in the percentage suggests a distinct increase in potential political power for Asian voters.

[Figure 3-1 — Ratios of Adult Citizens to Voting Age Population

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[47] While Lai (2011) examines political representation of Asian Americans in city councils, his analysis does not empirically test the effects of ethnic media, community-based organization, schools, and local economy on Asian American political representation or participation.

[48] Detailed description about Voting and Registration Supplement is available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/index.html (Last date of access: July 27, 2011).

[49] "Asians" refers to those reported as "Asian" alone, not in combination. As a result, the analysis here reveals a more conservative view with respect to the strength of the Asian American political force compared to including "Asian in combination."

by Race and Hispanic Origin]

Across all racial and ethnic groups, Whites show a small but consistent decline in citizen population size, while the Hispanic community increased by 2 percentage points from 2000 (7 percent) to 2008 (9 percent) (Table 3-1). For Blacks and Asians, their contribution to the adult citizens population remained stable (12 percent and 3 percent, respectively).

[Table 3-1 — The Composition of Adult Citizens in the United States]

Nationally, the average registration rate was above 70 percent during presidential election years, but lower in congressional election years (Figure 3-2). Differences in voter registration across racial and ethnic groups remained across time. For instance, Whites and Blacks (seven out of ten) were most likely to register, followed by Hispanics (six out of ten), and Asians (five out of ten) in presidential elections.

[Figure 3-2 — Registration Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin]

Each racial group showed a consistent increase in both registration rates and voting rates in presidential elections over time (Figure 3-2, 3-3). Though Asian voters were the smallest group in the U.S. population compared to other major racial and ethnic groups, they were at least as active as Hispanic voters. Still, Whites were most likely to vote, followed by Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (Figure 3-3). For presidential elections, the turnout rate of the general population increased 4 percentage points from 2000 (60 percent) to 2004 (64 percent) and remained stable in 2008, despite purported enthusiasm about the 2008 race. Although first-time eligible voters participated at higher levels in 2008 than in previous years, some other groups such as White supporters of the Republican Party chose to stay home on the election day (U.S. Census Bureau 2009c).[50]

[Figure 3-3 — Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin]

[50] For a more detailed analysis, see Yen 2009.

Registration appears to be the main hurdle to voting across groups. A majority of registered voters turn out to vote (Figure 3-4), regardless of race and ethnicity. Among registrants, turnout increased from 2004 to 2008 across all groups, with Black voters leading the way (87% in 2004 to 93% in 2008). For the first time, turnout among Black registrants surpassed that of Whites (by 3 percent). Senator Obama's presence and charisma (and race) undoubtedly explains this distinct increase. Hispanic (84%) and Asian (86%) registrants showed up at polls at a slightly higher rate, though still falling behind Blacks and Whites.

The gap in racial and ethnic group turnout rates has narrowed over time (Figure 3-4). This suggests that registration requirements are a significant roadblock to Asian and Hispanic political power. The marginal increase in Hispanic and Asian turnout reflects the growing consciousness derived from the expanding size of the two communities or perhaps increased party outreach. The data, however, are silent on this point.

[Figure 3-4 — Voting Rates among the Registered by Race and Hispanic Origin]

To better understand Asian American participation in contemporary American politics, in the next section I take a closer look at the relationships between demographics, registration and turnout by race and ethnicity in the 2008 presidential election. I am particularly interested in whether socioeconomic status predicts turnout within the Asian American population. If it does, then we know that the classic baseline model of political participation works at the individual-level, even as it mis-predicts the aggregate-level behavior for Asian Americans.

THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Comparisons of demographics and voting rates across race and ethnicity clearly illustrate the disconnection between Asian turnout and the conventional wisdom (Table 3-2, 3-3). In 2008, Whites and Asians had the highest levels of educational attainment

and income, far surpassing the national average (Table 3-2). For instance, one-third of White and 47 percent of Asian adult citizens had a bachelor's degree or above, compared to 27 percent of U.S. adult citizens, 17 percent of Blacks, and 14 percent of Hispanics. Similar patterns were found with respect to family income. More than one-fifth of Whites (22 percent) and almost one-third of Asians (29 percent) had a family income of $100,000 or above, while less than one-tenth of Blacks (8 percent) and only 12 percent of Hispanics did.

Regarding nativity, the Hispanic and Asian populations were largely comprised of immigrants (Table 3-2). More than half of Asian adult citizens (62 percent) were immigrants, compared to the national average of 7 percent, 3% for Whites, 6% for Blacks, and 26% for Hispanics. Since substantial research suggests that the greatest challenge for foreign-born immigrants is language (Cho 1999; Farkas et al. 2003), we know that more than half of Asian voters must overcome the language barrier in order to acquaint themselves with the political system.

Had socioeconomic status effectively forecast turnout level, one would expect Asians to be the most politically active racial/ethnic group in the U.S. Comparisons of voting rates by demographics and groups, however, dispute this prediction (Table 3-3). In addition, Table 3-3 further elucidates that Asian voters have not yet fully overcome the language barrier necessary to assume the political clout commensurate with their numbers.

[Table 3-2 — Demographics by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2008]

The survey data clearly indicate that Whites and Blacks are more politically active than Hispanics and Asians in the 2008 presidential election (Table 3-3). Seven out of ten White or Black adult citizens turned out to vote, but only five out of ten Hispanics or Asians did so. Interestingly, women were more politically involved than men in the 2008 presidential election, except among Asians. The voting rates of Asian women in

presidential elections, in fact, remained at the same levels as those of Asian men since 2000.[51]

With respect to socioeconomic status, the results show a positive correlation between educational attainment/family income and voting rates, but perhaps not as much for Asians. Among those with bachelor's degree, Whites (79 percent) and Blacks (76 percent) are the most politically active at polls, followed by Hispanics (70 percent) and Asians (57 percent) with remarkable gaps. This relationship is also observed between annual family income and voting rates. Among those with a higher family income than $100,000, eight out of ten Whites or Blacks voted, seven out of Hispanics voted, but only six out of Asians voted in 2008.

[Table 3-3 — Voting Rates in the 2008 Presidential Election by Demographics]

Although education and income fail to explain Asian American turnout at the aggregate level, both factors still have positive effects for Asian American turnout at the individual level (Figure 3-5 and 3-6).[52] I estimate effects of education and income on turnout at the individual level using the 2008 CPS data (only for adult citizens), while controlling for gender, age, and nativity.[53] Figure 3-5 and 3-6 highlight the differences and similarities between Asian Americans and other racial and ethnic groups. (See the Appendix A for complete results for each racial and ethnic group.)

First, there is no difference in turnout among Asians and Whites at the lower level of socioeconomic status. Second, significant differences of voting probability are more prominent at higher levels of education and income. Socioeconomic status obviously has

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[51] According to the CPS data, in 2000, the voting rate for male Asians and Pacific Islanders was 26 percent, for females it was 25 percent; in 2002, the voting rate for male Asians and Pacific Islanders was 20 percent, for females it was 19 percent; in 2004, the voting rate for males reported as Asian alone was 29 percent, for females it was 31 percent. The only exception of equal voting rate for both male and female Asians was in the 2006 midterm election: 30 percent for males and 34 percent for females.

[52] Both education and income also have positive effects on registration for all racial and ethnic groups. The slope (the magnitude of the effect), however, do not significantly vary across groups. Results are not presented, but available upon request.

[53] As mentioned earlier, the CPS data does not include variables on partisanship. Therefore, partisanship is not controlled in the baseline model.

an effect on turnout, and such effect is much greater for Whites (and Blacks) than for Asian Americans.[54] Even though we do not observe such patter at the aggregate level, the positive force of education and income undoubtedly exists for Asians at the individual level as well. However, effects of education and income are more limited for Asian Americans than for Whites.

For instance, the probability of voting for a White middle-age (30-64 years old) U.S.-born male who has less than first grade level of education (the minimal education) is 14%; the probability of voting for a White middle age U.S.-born male who has a Ph. D. (the maximal education) is 95%. The probability of voting for an Asian middle-age U.S.-born male who has less than first grade level of education is 21%; the probability of voting for a Asian middle age U.S.-born male who has a Ph. D. is 81%. In other words, the maximal effect of education on Whites is 81-percent increase in turnout, but significantly less (60 percentage points) on Asians. Similarly, the maximal effect of income on turnout is greater among Whites (35 percentage points increase) than Asians (20 percentage point increase).[55]

In addition, Blacks appear to be the most politically active group, all else being equal. By contrast, Asian Americans and Hispanics are not only less politically engaged, their participation level is also less affected by education and income. However, there is still noticeable difference between Hispanics and Asian Americans at higher levels of income. For instance, the maximal change in probability of voting (in corresponding to the maximal change in income levels) for a Latino who was born in the U.S. at his middle age with a high school or equivalent diploma is 30% (from 39% at an income of less than $5,000 to 69% at more than $150,000). Plainly put, the marginal increase in voting

[54] Results of comparing coefficients of education for Whites-Asians (χ^2=40.51, $p < 0.001$) and Blacks-Asians (χ^2=4.44, $p < 0.05$) are significant at least at the 0.05 level. On the other hand, effects of education on registration for different group are not significantly different from one another.

[55] The calculation is conditioned on a U.S.-born middle-age male who has a high school or equivalent diploma.

probability for Asian Americans is smaller than any other racial and ethnic group. Even at the maximal levels of education (Ph. D.) and income (more than $150,000), Asian Americans' turnout (85%) is still significantly lower than Whites and Blacks (both 97%), and even slightly lower than Hispanics (89%).[56]

[Figure 3-5 Predicated Probability of Voting by Education, Race and Ethnicity]

[Figure 3-6 Predicted Probability of Voting by Income, Race and Ethnicity]

The aforementioned evidence indicates that socioeconomic resources are a factor in turnout for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, but much less so for Asians. The last three rows in Table 3-3 may contribute to understanding this conundrum. For instance, the effect of education is approximately the same across racial and ethnic groups after controlling for nativity (Figure 3-7 and 3-8). There is no difference in the slope of education effect between foreign-born Whites and Asians, or U.S.-born Whites and Asians. However, education has a greater impact on turnout among the U.S.-born Asian Americans than their foreign-born counterpart. This gap suggests factors beyond socioeconomic status are also in play for Asian American turnout.

[Figure 3-7 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (Foreign-born)]

[Figure 3-8 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (U.S.-born)]

The U.S.-born in general are more electorally involved than the naturalized. This fact holds true for Whites and Blacks, but does not apply to Hispanics and Asians, for whom the voting rates of the U.S.-born were lower than their naturalized counterparts (Table 3-3). The seemingly counter-intuitive finding may be attributed to the appreciation of democratic values from immigrants—voluntary immigrants usually seek for better opportunity in an environment that deserves their respect and efforts (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), or immigrants' eagerness to exercise their political rights.

[56] The calculation is conditioned on a U.S.-born middle-age male.

There are three possible causes of the turnout gap between Asians and Hispanics versus Whites and Blacks. First, among immigrants, the major difference between the U.S.-born and the naturalized lies in the socialization and acculturation processes. The U.S.-born are more likely to have English as their native language, while the naturalized acquire English proficiency later. In addition, the U.S.-born are more likely to receive their main education in the U.S., through which they learn about the American history and political system. On the contrary, the naturalized need to study these subjects in order to obtain their American citizenship. This implies that the naturalized is more likely to face the registration hurdle (where, when, and how) than the U.S.-born. The above differences are likely to result in a disparity in the political behaviors between different generations. However, the post-1965 newcomers' offspring, compared to their predecessors, are usually better educated and wealthier. Perhaps a sense of complacency resulted in the low level of turnout among Hispanics and Asians at the group level (Lai 2011) and has delayed the attainment of political equality among Hispanics and Asians.

While resources are less of a concern for Asian voters than others (Table 3-2),[57] registration appears to be a major barrier. Even among the registered, however, the voting rate for Asians has been lower than for Whites and Blacks. Collectively, these facts are puzzling; Asian Americans as a group show a lower level of electoral participation at the national level than other racial and ethnic groups, and their numerical strength has not effectively translated into political power. Traditional explanations of democratic mobilization (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) seem to require expansion or even amendment.

[57] This is not to say that Asian Americans are exempted from poverty. For instance, according the Census Bureau, though fewer Asian Americans (13%) than Blacks (26%) and Hispanics (25%) living in poverty in 2010, the proportion is slightly larger than non-Hispanic Whites (9%) (Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011).

CONCLUSION

This chapter presents an overview of Asian American political participation in the twenty-first century. Specifically, I compare Asian registration and turnout rates to those of other racial and ethnic groups. I then take a closer look at the relationships between demographics and political participation by race and ethnicity in the last presidential election cycle. The comparisons demonstrate the disconnection between Asian turnout in theory and in reality, and show the gap between promise and reality for Asian American political participation.

Not all the news is dismal. The marginal increases in Hispanic and Asian turnout in 2008 perhaps reflects the growing consciousness promoted by grass-root organizations that accompany the expanding electorates. And in general, the American population is more and more politically engaged. Though the political disparity among groups remains in the contemporary American politics, the gaps are slowly shrinking.

Comparisons of registration and voting rates also demonstrate that registration poses a significant challenge to Asians and Hispanics in translating their numerical strength into political power. Upon completion of voter registration, Asian Americans appear to be only slightly less active than Whites and Blacks, but not than Hispanics. Unlike other groups, the Asian American population comprises a majority of foreign-born immigrants who are likely to appreciate the democratic values (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), and need time to overcome language barriers and acquire knowledge about the American political system. The lack of Asian American political participation could be attributable to limited English proficiency (Cho 1999; Farkas et al. 2003), parents' lack of political knowledge (Wong and Tseng 2008), and possibly a sense of complacency among the offspring of the post-1965 immigrants (Lai 2011). These inevitably depress Asian American political engagement.

Finally, one major challenge for studying Asian American political participation is the group's highly diverse ethnic makeup as well as their distinct historical trajectories

in the United States. Largely constituted of immigrants from a wide range of Asian countries, for Asian Americans to act as a political bloc, they have to bring all subgroups together under a big umbrella. One important question, then, is "to what extent and by what means individual Asian Americans connect to the larger Asian American community resulting in a (pan)ethnic identity?" Another is "How does this group identity, such as 'Asian American' or 'ethnic American,' affect their turnout?" To better understand the effect of acculturation, cause and effect of group identity, the next chapter focuses on how acculturation processes and group identity influence Asian American turnout.

CHAPTER FOUR: Effects Of Acculturation And Group Connectedness On Turnout Among Asian Americans

" 'It will still take a little while to get to the same place as other minority groups,' said Frank Y. Liu, a law professor at Duquesne University and former president of the Organization of Chinese-Americans. … 'Asian-Americans, because of their cultural background, it takes them a while to really assert themselves as being American.' "— "Asian-Americans, Long Dormant Politically, Are Starting to Flex Their Muscles at the Polls." Philippe Shepnick. 1998, October 14. *The Hill*

As mentioned in chapter two, traditional SES-based models of political participation have failed to explain the behavior of the burgeoning Asian American population.[58] Although status is highly correlated with participation rates for Blacks and, to a lesser degree, Latinos, it is unrelated to Asian American participation at the aggregate level. The failure is especially noticeable because with the relaxation of immigration laws in 1965, quota preferences have effectively lured educated and wealthy Asians to the U.S. We are thus in need of alternative causal mechanisms. The size of foreign born among Asian Americans suggests that the majority of this population is still going through the process of adjustment and adaptation. In this chapter I focus on the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout.

Previous research shows that the process of acculturation affects how immigrants adjust to new environments (Lien 1994; Rudmin 2003; Berry 2005).[59] The postulated reason for this is simple: acculturation experiences and connection to the group help to cultivate one's group

[58] Lien (1994) conceptualizes acculturation, group identity, ethnic ties, alienation, and deprivation as the multidimensional ethnicity while comparing the relations between "ethnicity" and political participation among Asian Americans and Mexican Americans. After controlling for these multi-dimensions, Lien finds that socioeconomic resources are still in play among Mexican Americans, but not among Asian Americans.

[59] Berry (2005, 698, 699) defines "acculturation" as "the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members." In particular, at the individual level, acculturation involves "changes in a person's behavioral repertoire." During this acculturation, individuals may adopt different strategies such as integration (in which each cultural communities engage each other resulting in mutual acceptance and forging a hybrid identity), assimilation (individuals unconditionally conforming to the dominant culture and identity in the host society), separation (individuals withdraw from the dominant culture and cling to their own heritage culture and identity), and marginalization (individuals not only being unable to maintain heritage culture and identity, but also separating from the dominant culture in the host society). Here, I refer to those who seek integration strategy as the "better acculturated" or the "better integrated."

identity in the present context resulting in the individual's behavior (Figure 4-1). The better integrated are likely to feel accepted by the society as a whole resulting in a sense of security and comfort in partaking political activities. But we know little about how this works for Asian Americans and whether or not variation in acculturation accounts for group identity and turnout among this group.

[Figure 4-1 About Here: Conceptual Framework]

To understand what factors drive Asian American participation, this chapter examines the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout among Asian Americans. I begin by establishing the relations between the above variables, follow by describing the data and method, proceed to a presentation of the multivariate analysis, and conclude with a discussion of the political implications of the findings.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, ACCULTURATION, GROUP CONNECTEDNESS, AND GROUP IDENTITY

Acculturation is defined as the degree to which one adapts to the present environment. The adoption of an "American" identity implies the acceptance and endorsement of the core values in American culture. Personal interviews of Chinese immigrants' offspring conducted for this project suggest that this notion may be taking hold among Asian Americans. (See Appendix B for detailed backgrounds of interviewees.) For instance, W.L. (identified as "Chinese American") offered that his father strongly believed in individualism and freedom, which he considered the "American Dream." In his opinion, this was what connected his father (and himself) to America. Past studies have found that someone who embraces his "American-ness" would be more likely to vote, implying that the better integrated tend to be more politically active (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). Does this hold for Asian Americans? W.L.'s father did not, in fact, vote. Consider Liu's introductory quote, "it takes them [Asian Americans] a while to really assert themselves as being American." Time may condition this transition process.

There is also the possibility that Asian Americans will come to see themselves as members of a distinct minority group within the U.S. Such a group identity, once activated, can serve as an information cue in campaigns and elections (Miller et al 1981; Dawson 1994; Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2006). The identification with "Asian-ness" or ethnicity implies the recognition of one's own ancestry and commonality with other members in the group. With an established social and economic link, the individual is likely to infer personal interests from the group's interests and needs (Dawson 1994). From the interviews conducted for the present study, increased Asian political representation is considered the most important issue the Asian American community faces. The underlying mechanism is that upon the acknowledgement of such need, those who are aware of both their American-ness as well as Asian-ness or ethnicity are more likely to claim not only their right as American citizens, but also their obligation as members of the (pan-)ethnic group.

For example, W.L. considered himself politically active. He not only embraced his unique cultural heritage (he defined himself primarily as "Asian American") but also consciously tried to break the stereotypes of Asian Americans, such as "foreigner" and "model minority." When asked about the 2008 presidential election, W.L. admitted that he was more favorable towards Senator Obama because Obama was an African American. He also believed that Obama's candidacy encouraged more minorities to participate in politics. W.L. explained, "It is more favorable with respect to again the racial ideas, ideologies that this country is profound in and continue to a certain extent to hold." To W.L., being connected to a larger ethnic community motivated him to take his part in the governing process.

Generally speaking, blended identities are products resulted from the acculturation process in which the confrontation, negotiation, and compromise of different cultural and social values occurs (Nagel 1994; Berry 2005). In adapting to the present political world, immigrants and their offspring (re)construct their identities and accordingly change their behavioral repertoire. The motivation for Asian Americans to do so is driven by the desire to be "in," to be part of the mainstream ("American"), as well as the fact of being "different" (their Asian

appearances and cultural practices). In their case, the acquisition of American-ness and the awareness of Asian-ness or their own ethnicity take place simultaneously. Conceptually, individual Asians in the United States can belong to an Asian or ethnic community within American society and nation—these two components can co-exist compatibly with each other.

Both in theory and practice, for new arrivals, group identity that embraces both their ancestral culture and their American-ness is likely to motivate the possessor to participate in politics. The American-ness reflects one's (desired) integration into the society, so he exercises his political rights and civic duties. Connecting to one's own Asian culture ties the individual to a broader (minority) community, a collective body; the sense of connectedness as well as her hybrid identity press on her the interest and need for the group. The absence of either element in her identity (i.e., "ethnic" only or "Asian" only, or even "American") can weaken the motivation to participate politically. Therefore, it is important to observe that acculturation experiences can cultivate both a sense of American-ness and an identity as a member of a specific (pan)ethnic group.

In summary, numerous studies tell us that the acculturation process of immigrants facilitates not only identity formulation, but also engaging other groups (Berry 2005) and participation in politics (Lien 1994) as characterized by Figure 4-1. The reasoning generates implication in the form of four working hypotheses for Asian American political participation.

> *H1: The better acculturated Asian Americans are more likely to vote. Those who have been in the U.S. longer and those who are more comfortable using English have more opportunities to observe and interact with the political system, and thus more likely to be able to gather information about where, when, and how to vote.*
>
> *H2:Those who embrace both their American-ness and Asian-ness/ethnicity are more likely to vote.*
>
> *H3: The better acculturated Asian Americans—those who reside in the U.S. for a longer period of time, and those who are more comfortable using English—are more likely to acknowledge their American-ness in their primary identities.*

H4: Asian Americans who feel a sense of connectedness to the Asian American (or ethnic) community and those who experience racial and ethnic discrimination are more likely to be aware of their Asian-ness or their own ethnicity in their primary identities.

DATA AND METHOD

To examine the relationships between turnout and acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity, I use the 2000-2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) data (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). The units of analysis are individual Asian Americans. In addition to the PNAAPS, I refer to sixteen in-depth interviews with Asian voter, activists, and elite conducted for this project in Austin, Texas, as supplements to the multivariate analysis.[60] The participants of the interviews were recruited through personal networks. While the interviews could not represent the Asian American community as a whole, the content was very informative for the next part of the project (Chapter five).

Note that while Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) explore multiple political orientations and the behavior of Asian Americans with the PNAAPS data in *The Politics of Asian Americans*, my focus here is to investigate the effects of acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group identity on Asian American turnout. The PNAAPS relied on telephone interviews of respondents spread across five metropolitan areas: Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco (N=1,218). This reflects the fact that Asian Americans tend to cluster around metropolitan areas (Barnes and Bennett 2002, 7). "The average incidence rate for interviews drawn from the listed surname sample is 41%. The incidence rate for RDD (Random-Digit Dialing) interviews is 15%. The average refusal rate is 25%, with 34% in the listed sample and 3.5% in the RDD sample."[61] The PNAAPS is the first large Asian American sample ever collected. The PNAAPS is also unique in that it included measures of acculturation experiences, perceptions about the group, racial identity, and political engagement.

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[60] Ages of participants interviewed range from 20 to 55.

[61] Pei-te Lien. 2004. Codebook for Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001 (ICPSR 3832).

The demography of the sample is broadly representative of the Asian American population nationally. The PNAAPS sample encompasses Chinese (27% of the sample, including Mainland, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), Philippine (18%), Japanese (15%), Korean (14%), Vietnamese (11%), Indian and Pakistan (10%), and other (5%) respondents. The average age is 44 years old (ranging from 18 to 100). Gender is evenly split. A majority of the sample (68%) has some college or higher education. The median income is $40K-$60K. With respect to political ideology, 40% of the sample describes their views as "liberal," 25% says "conservative," and 35% considers themselves in the middle. A majority of the sample (63%) identifies with the Democratic Party, 27% with the Republican Party, and 10% identify as independent. Overall, the PSAAPS sample is slightly older, more educated, and less wealthy than the national Asian population. Also, the PNAAPS sample has a larger proportion of Asian-born individuals (75%)[62] than the national Asian population (67% of Asian population in the U.S. was foreign-born).[63] Still, these differences are relatively minor and ought not affect the current project.

ACCULTURATION, GROUP CONNECTEDNESS, AND GROUP IDENTITY IN THE PNAAPS SAMPLE

Given the definition of acculturation (one's adaptation to the present environment after the migration), I use two measures to estimate the acculturation level, including how long one had resided in the current town or city,[64] and to what degree one uses English at home (mainly English, some English, no English). The length of current residency is important because it

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[62] In order to distinguish of which generation the participants were, Lien, Conway and Wong asked participants "Were either of your parents born in Asia?"

[63] Elizabeth M. Grieco, 2010, "Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2007," Census Bureau Report. http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf (last access: June 18 2011)

[64] I acknowledge the measure is somewhat conservative since some respondents' previous homes might already be in the U.S. In the NPAAPS, although Lien asked respondents "how many years have you lived in the United States on a permanent basis?" those who were born in America were not asked this question. If I were to substitute the missing values for the U.S.-born in this question with their age, the results of the "Asian American" identity and turnout models remain the same. As a result, I choose the current measure. Furthermore, the conservative measure in fact underestimates the effect of time spent in the U.S. on group identity and turnout. In other words, the results give me confidence in the influence of time on group identity and turnout among Asian Americans.

indicates not only how long one has been exposed to the local culture and community, but also the degree of residential mobility. Those who have been in the same locale for a longer period of time are more likely to develop a new identity, build up new social ties, and more likely to participate in politics (Highton 2000). Though time is not sufficient for full acculturation, it is a necessary component for successful integration. Participants of the PNAAPS, on average, have spent more than a decade in the current city or town of their residency (13 years, ranging from one to 79 years). Among different nationalities, the average stay ranges from 28 years (Japanese) to 8 years (Indians/Pakistanis).

Home language is also critical to measuring acculturation. When at home with family, individuals are no longer forced to speak the "official" language in order to conduct business or communicate to peers, but can freely choose the language that they are most comfortable speaking. Therefore, the language used at home indicates how well one is (or trying to be) adapted to the environment and to what degree one has overcome the language barrier to integrate into the mainstream. Those who feel more comfortable speaking English at home are more likely to incorporate their "American-ness" in their identities and more likely to vote. One quarter of the PNAAPS sample usually spoke English at home; another quarter of the sample used some English but mixed with other languages, while half of the sample usually used languages other than English at home. The differences in home language significantly vary by nationalities (χ^2=610.07, $p < .001$). The Japanese used English at home more often than other groups (79% of the Japanese used mainly English at home), followed by Filipinos (43%) and Indians/Pakistanis (21%). Conversely, more than seventy percent of the Chinese (79%), Koreans (70%), and Vietnamese (78%) used a non-English language at home. Again, the observed pattern here could reflect the higher proportion of U.S.-born Japanese and English as one of official languages in the Philippines, India, and Pakistan.

The second concept of interest, group connectedness, is determined by three factors. As described earlier, group identity functions on one's perceived connection to the group (Dawson 1994) as well as its members (Kaufmann 2003). Those with a sense of shared fate and culture

with other Asians or their own ethnic group are more likely to adopt the (pan-)ethnic identity and more likely to vote. To measure group connectedness, participants were asked whether they thought (1) "what happens generally to other groups of Asians in this country will affect what happens in your life?" (yes or no), (2) "what happens generally to other groups of [respondent's ethnic group] in this country will affect what happens in your life?" (yes or no) , (3) and to what degree one thought that groups of Asians in America are culturally homogenous (very similar, somewhat similar, somewhat different, or very different). Approximately half of the sample perceived a sense of shared fate with other Asians and their own ethnic group, as well as a certain degree of cultural commonality among Asian Americans. More specifically, fifty four percent of the sample thought what happened to other Asians in the U.S. would affect their own lives. Sixty percent of the sample thought what happened to other members of the same ethnic group would affect their personal lives. A majority of the sample (52%) considered Asian cultures similar (9% "very similar" and 43% "somewhat similar").

The last factor used to measure group connectedness is racial and ethnic discrimination experiences. Respondents were asked whether they experienced discrimination in the U.S. due to his ethnic background (yes or no). Existing studies show that experiencing discrimination can make one aware of his racial and ethnic background (and thus connecting himself to the group) and can facilitate the development of a panethnic identity (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Masuoka and Rim 2007). As a result, those who experience discrimination are more likely to take actions—to vote. Among the PNAAPS sample, more than one third (34%) reported some form of ethnic discrimination. Koreans reported the highest level of racial and ethnic discrimination (42%), while only 11% of Vietnamese said they experienced some form of discrimination due to their racial and ethnic background (χ^2=38.61, $p < .001$).

Group identity, as described earlier, is a psychological identification with (and attachment to) a larger community. It encompasses an individual's connection to the group. Operationally, it is measured by asking whether someone thinks of himself as an American, Asian American, Asian, ethnic American (e.g., Japanese American), or in ethnic terms only (e.g.,

Korean). Figure 4-2 presents the distribution of group identity by ethnic communities. Sixteen percent of the sample considered themselves to be "Asian American" (ranging from 13% to 23% across ethnicities), and 12% described themselves as "American." More than one third of the sample (36%) considered themselves as "ethnic American," and another one third (31%) identified in "ethnic" terms only. This implies that most (36%+31%) Asians in America do not identify beyond ethnic divisions. Twenty percent of Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos in the sample thought themselves as "Asian American," and at least one third within each ethnic group considered themselves "ethnic American." Greater percentages of Japanese, Filipinos, Indians, and Pakistanis saw themselves as "American," while 40% of Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese identified in ethnic terms only.

Nativity and language help explain this pattern. The Japanese have a relatively longer history in the U.S., and many Japanese are Nisei (second generation), Sansei (third generation), or even beyond. As acculturation theory predicts, the longer one resides in a society, the more likely the individual is to learn and adopt the local values, norms, and practices. Consequently, a Japanese American may think of himself as "American" before recognizing his Japanese ancestry. Two reasons could contribute to the slightly larger number of Filipinos and Indians/Pakistanis in the PNAAPS sample identifying as "American." First, more Filipinos (34% of the sample) and Indians/Pakistanis (12%) were born in the U.S. than other ethnic groups (except for the Japanese, of which 79% were born in the U.S.) (χ^2=412.07, $p < .001$). Second, Filipinos and Indians/Pakistanis were more conversant in English compared to other ethnic groups because English is one of the official languages in Philippines, India, and Pakistan. Consequently, the language barrier is less of a hurdle for acculturation into American society for these groups and they are more likely to identify as "American."

[Figure 4-2 Distribution of Group Identity by Ethnicity]

Although some Asian Americans viewed themselves primarily as "Asian" or "ethnic" only, the following analysis focuses on the (pan-)ethnic "Asian American" and "ethnic American" identities for two reasons. First and most importantly, the two components of pan-

ethnicity ("Asian-ness"/ethnicity and "American-ness") are important for Asian Americans to act as a bloc in the political arena. As mentioned earlier, lacking either element of the (pan-)ethnic identity can weaken the appeal for political participation.[65] Therefore, in addition to the effect of group identity on Asian turnout, this analysis also focuses on investigating the causes and consequences of these identities. Second, although Asian cultures are heterogeneous in some ways, they share some common bonds; beyond having similar appearances and diets, they tend to value tradition and have relatively hierarchical family structures.[66]

To distinguish effects of specific group identities on turnout, the turnout model includes three dummy variables coded 1 as those who primarily identified with the term, and 0 otherwise: "American," "Asian American," and "ethnic American." The reference group are those of "Asian" or "ethnic" only identities.

Beyond measuring acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity, the analysis includes basic demographics to control for effects not accruing to the core variables. These demographics are nativity, ethnicity, age, education (with or without any college experiences), family income (below or beyond $60K), and gender. Nativity is measured by whether one was born in an Asian country or not. To capture the effect of specific ethnic groups (whether there are baseline differences in panethnic identification for particular group, compared with everyone else in the sample) and keep the model as parsimonious as possible, I create three dummy variables for the groups that are more than 15% of the sample: Chinese (28%), Japanese (19%), and Filipinos (16%). In addition, conventionally important political attitudes are also taken into consideration: political interest, strength of partisanship, and religious attendance.[67]

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[65] If one only sees himself as American, he can be more active because he grasps his sense of belonging in the nation, or he can be less active because he does not feel the significance of his vote. If one only considers himself Asian, he is likely to observe American politics as an outsider and does not participate.

[66] Founder of "Drink Club," Kelvin Yip, a 23-year-old market analyst who lives in San Francisco, described the mingling with other Asians, "What's happening here is people are talking to other Asian ethnicities, and we're seeing we have similar upbringings, and we see Asian cultures do share many similarities." ("Asians Pursue a United State," Ryan Kim, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 2001, August 2)

[67] For literature on relationships between political participation and political interest as well as church attendance, see Brady, Verba, and Schlozman's "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation"(1995).

ANALYZING ASIAN AMERICAN TURNOUT IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 4-1 offers models of turnout in the 2000 presidential election using a binary logit estimator. Coefficients are estimated of explanatory variables' effects on participation in the 2000 presidential election. Acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group identity have positive impacts on Asian turnout, though we should interpret the results with caution.[68] The more stable is one's residence, the more likely he would vote, all else being equal. English-usage at home, however, did not influence whether one voted or not. This is also applicable to other groups in terms of residential stability. Furthermore, given the high percentage of foreign-born Asians in the U.S., many of them are new arrivals and integration takes time. The longer Asians settle in one place, the more familiar they are with the American electoral system and local environments, the more stable are their local networks, the more likely they will vote.[69]

A sense of shared culture also increases turnout, while a sense of shared fate with other Asians or racial/ethnic discrimination experiences do not. It is possible that those who perceive commonality among Asian cultures are more likely to consider themselves as part of the minority community. As a result, the perception of shared culture improves the probability one would vote.[70]

Regarding the influence of group identity on Asian turnout, those who identified as "Asian American" or "ethnic American" were more likely to vote than those who identified as "Asian" or "ethnic" only. Recall that we presume (pan-)ethnic identity is driven by both affinity for a broader ethnic community and the nation. It is possible that those who embrace an "Asian/ethnic American" identity are prone to espouse the "American" values of political rights

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[68] In examining the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout, I choose binary logit model for two reasons. First, though some factors are to certain extent correlated, the variance-covariance matrix of the full model in Table 4-1 shows no serious evidence of multi-collinearity. Second, while utilizing two-stage estimators may be theoretically appropriate based on Firgure 4-1, the interpretation of a binary logit model is more straightforward and intuitively understandable. Therefore, binary logit modeling is a reasonable choice in analyzing factors of interest.

[69] I test whether length of current residency or English usage interacts with "Asian American" identity influencing turnout but find no support. The results of including interaction terms do not alter findings from the turnout model. To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, I exclude the interaction terms from the chapter.

[70] This may be even more prominent when a threat to the group is present. This condition, however, is untested due to available and yet limited data.

and freedom (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Barreto and Munoz 2003) while acknowledging their Asian-ness or ethnicity. Those who primarily identified as "American," however, are no more likely to vote than those identified with "Asian" or "ethnic" only.

Among the control variables used to explain turnout in 2000, significant effects are associated with nativity, age, and not surprisingly, political interest, strength of partisanship, and religious attendance. Those who were born in Asian countries were significantly less likely to vote than their U.S.-born counterpart. Nativity possibly captures the remaining of acculturation impact for the Asian-born; those who experienced the dramatic changes of migrating to a different environment and only recently learned about the new society and political system are less likely to vote. To the Asian-born, the cost of voting is relatively higher than the U.S.-born who grew up in America and do not need to make much effort to vote.

Predictably, those who are more interested in politics in general, who are strong partisans, and who attend religious service more frequently are more likely to vote, all else being equal.[71] The significance of religious attendance implies the importance of civic skills and/or local networks. It is also important to point out that while the CPS data show supportive evidence for the effect of education on turnout at the individual level, the relationship is missing in the PNAAPS data.

[Table 4-1 Results of Turnout Models]

Of course, gauging real-world effects from logit coefficients is difficult. Fortunately, logit coefficients can be transformed into probabilities enabling more straightforward interpretation. Unlike regular regression coefficients, the predicted dependent variable changes nonlinearly as the values of the other independent variables change. To measure the maximum effect of the significant variables, we hold all other variables at their means (for continuous variables) or mode (for category variables) and change only the variable of interest from its minimum value to

[71] These findings hold even after controlling for political interest and/or involvement in politics of homelands.

its maximum.[72] For Asians who just immigrated to the U.S., the estimated probability of voting was 32%, all else being equal. After living in the U.S. for a decade, the estimated probability of voting for Asian Americans increased 13 percentage points; after another ten years, their probability of voting increased another 14 percentage points; and after another decade, their probability of voting increased another 12 percentage points. The marginal increase by the length of residency is thus not only statistically but also substantively significant. Those who lived in the current city/town for 79 years are almost certain to vote (predicted probability of voting is 97%).

Among group connectedness factors, the estimated probability of voting for those who feel a great deal of cultural commonality among Asians was 25 percentage points higher than the probability of voting for those who thought Asian cultures were very different. Obviously, the perceived homogeneity among Asian cultures improved Asian turnout significantly. By contrast, neither a sense of shared fate nor experience of racial/ethnic discrimination has significant or substantive impact on the likelihood of voting.

Those whose identities embrace not only their American-ness, but also their Asian-ness or ethnicity are more likely to vote than those who only identified with their Asian or ethnic communities. Specifically, those who identified as "Asian American" 55% were 20 percentage points more likely to vote in the 2000 presidential election that those who identified as "Asian/ethnic only." Similarly, those identified as "ethnic American" are more likely to vote than those identified as "Asian" or "ethnic" only (48% and 35%, respectively). Though

[72] Specifically, the average length of residency in the current city/town is 13.04 years, the average shared commonality among Asian cultures is 2.46 (on a scale ranged from 1 "very different" to 4 "very similar" among Asian cultures), the average age in the sample is 43.28 years old, the average general political interest is 2.86 (on a scale ranged from 1 "not at all interested" to 4 "very interested"), and average frequency for church attendance is 2.12 (on a scale ranged from 0 "never" to 4 "every week") meaning at least once or twice a month attending religious services. Among categorical variables, the plurality chose to use language other than English at home, identified as "ethnic American," sensed certain degree of shared fate with other Asians in this country, did not experience racial or ethnic discrimination, were born in Asian countries, were Chinese, had some college experiences, fell in the category of below $60K household income, were male, and did not consider themselves as strong partisans.

"American" identifiers are substantively more likely to vote (50%) than "Asian/ethnic only" identifiers, the difference is not statistically significant.

Nativity, age, political interest, partisan strength, and religious service attendance also influence Asian turnout. The estimated probability of voting for the Asian-born is 25 percentage points less than that for the U.S.-born. The predicted probability of those who just entered the "voting-age-eligible electorate" was 29%. For every ten years span, the estimated probability of voting increased approximately 8 percentage points (predicted probability of voting for a 28 year-old is 36%, for a 38 is 44%, and for a 68 year-old is 67%). The likelihood of voting among those who had at least some college education (+10 percentage points) and those whose family income were beyond $60K (+7 percentage points) are higher than their counterparts, though the difference is not statistically significant. Not surprisingly, those who were very interested in politics (+25 percentage points compared to who were not at all interested in politics), strong partisans (+13 percentage points compared to non-strong partisans), and those who attended religious service weekly (+27 percentage points compared to those who did not attend religious service at all) had a higher turnout than their counterparts.

The findings support the hypotheses concerning the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on Asian turnout. In particular, the data show that lower levels of acculturation and group connectedness contribute to Asian Americans' low turnout. As suggested earlier, the low turnout among Asian Americans can be attributed to the absence of either American-ness or Asian-ness/ethnicity in one's identity. Acculturation is a very time-consuming process. Judy Chu's reflection upon her 2009 victory in the 32nd District of California captures the essence of time in the acculturation process, "Now, two generations later," she observes, "here I am, his granddaughter, a member of Congress."[73] Not only years, but also generations are what it takes for an immigrant to grasp political power "from nothing."

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[73] "Cutting Her Own Path," Kris Kitto, *The Hill*, 2009, September 10, 2009. Judy Chu is the first elected Chinese American female to Congress ("Judy Chu Trounces Rivals in Congressional Race," Jean Merl, *Los Angeles Times*, 2009, July 14).

Though being aware of one's own ethnic background and simultaneously embracing one's new nationality can improve turnout among Asians in the U.S., cultivating a new identity undoubtedly takes time. The meaning and the formation of this identity, however, are unclear. For instance, who are likely to see themselves as "Asian American" or "ethnic American?" Does perceived cultural commonality influence one's self-identification? Do various levels of group connectedness affect group identity formation?

Less than half of the PNAAPS sample perceived significant commonality among Asian cultures (17% "very similar" and 30% "somewhat similar"). This is not to say this lack of perceived commonality is somehow "wrong." Although Asians are bound together by similar physical appearances (black hair and yellow skin), typical upbringing (achievement-oriented) and family structure (hierarchical), Asians are diverse with respect to language, country of origin, and customs. Therefore, different ethnic groups may not see each other as allies. Hoon Lee, a 26-year-old San Francisco consultant, though excited and proud when he sees Asian Americans on the ballot, also remembers occasions in which he felt a gap between Chinese and Korean.[74] Lacking a broad and sturdy common ground among Asian groups may present a barrier to forging a strong panethnic coalition. I next investigate how acculturation experiences and group connectedness affect group identity while controlling for important demographics.

ANALYZING GROUP IDENTITY AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS

Table 4-2 presents models of panethnic identity as a function of acculturation and group connectedness. More particularly, a multinomial logit estimator is used to generate coefficients representing the independent effects of a wide range of explanation and control variables. The outcome categories include "American," "Asian American," "ethnic American," and "Asian/ethnic only" with the last group serving as the reference. Note that a sense of shared fate

[74] "Asians Pursue a United State," Ryan Kim, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 2001, August 2.

with members of one's ethnic group is included in the group identity model, while political attitudes and religious attendance is excluded. The interest here is to understand the formation and causes of group identity, and thus it is reasonable to control for one's perceived shared fate with other members in the same ethnic group. On the other hand, political interest, partisan strength and religious attendance, though are positively related to political participation, are not theoretically associated with group identity. For the sake of simplicity, these political attitudes and religious attendance are excluded from the group identity model.

Most important for present purposes, acculturation experiences and group connectedness matter in cultivating a hybrid (pan-)ethnic identity. Among different aspects of acculturation, both language (English usage) and residential stability are important factors. Those who felt more comfortable using English at home were more likely to embrace an identity acknowledging their American-ness, all else being equal. This, of course, was predicted: language used at home shows the user's preference and reflects the subtle but powerful influence of language in the Asian American integration process.

Length of residency in the current city/town also helps to explain a hybrid identity ("Asian/ethnic American"). However, it is reasonable to postulate that although time in this country approximates one's exposure to American culture and society, it only reflects opportunities; it does not guarantee that someone will voluntarily choose to submerge himself in his surroundings. Indeed, the residential concentration of Asian Americans (Teranishi 2004) can to some degree prevent residents from interacting with the mainstream.[75] Still, though time is insufficient to foster a hybrid identity, it is necessary.

Among group connectedness factors, experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination most effectively suppress the likelihood of identifying as "American," "Asian American," or "ethnic American." As reactive ethnicity theory predicts (Portes and Rumbaut 1996), such experiences

[75] Molly, a personal friend and a member of the Austin Chinese Church, shared her upbringing in a church dinner event ("Mulan's Dilemma") on April 16, 2011. As a second generation Chinese daughter, Molly resented her mother's lack of English proficiency, which required Molly to stay home and be a translator, instead of going to playground.

further highlight the racial or ethnic uniqueness of the individual and make her aware of her difference from the majority of the society. In addition, a sense of shared cultural commonality elevates the likelihood of embracing the "Asian American" identity, compared to the chance of identifying as "Asian/ethnic" only. This implies that a sense of common culture is perhaps the surest path to establishing a vibrant, engaged Asian American voting bloc. In contrast, shared fate (with other Asians or the ethnic community) perceptions do not appear to foster a broader sense of (pan-)ethnic identity. The absence of sensing a shared fate among Asians (or within the ethnic community) can be attributed to their different historical paths and geographical distributions. Asian groups, unlike African Americans who share the memory of slavery, do not have a history of collective social or political deprivation. Therefore, to Asian Americans, the bond between individuals and the (pan-)ethnic group as a whole may be weak.

Among the control variables, nativity (U.S.-born status) and gender have influence on group identity. As predicted, those who were born in Asian countries are less likely to embrace see themselves as "American" or "Asian American" than as "Asian/ethnic only." Perhaps the status of being native-born and the Asian born mean more than nativity? Is there particular pattern of demographics by nativity? For instance, nine out of ten Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese were born in Asian countries, eight out of ten Indian/Pakistanis, and six out of ten Filipino were also Asian-born. The only exception is Japanese (eight out of ten were born in the U.S.) This implies the significance of each group's entrance and development in the United States. In addition, compared to the Asian-born, the U.S.-born Asian Americans tend to have a higher level of residential stability, a higher level of education and family income, to see themselves as "(ethnic) American," slightly more likely to perceive a higher degree of cultural commonality among Asians, more likely to experience racial/ethnic discrimination, and less likely to attend religious service.[76]

[76] These differences achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level.

These patterns certainly suggest substantive and systemic differences between the U.S.-born and Asian-born Asian American populations. Yet, the underlying mechanism is not detected in the PNAAPS questionnaire and thus unable to be tested. In addition, Asian women, compared to men, are less likely to adopt identities that acknowledging their American-ness than their Asian-ness or ethnicity.

[Table 4-2 Estimating Asian American Group Identity]

In summary, the results offer tentative support for the hypothesis of the effect of acculturation and group connectedness on group identity. Those who are more comfortable using English are likely to embrace their American-ness. Those who have a higher degree of residential stability are more likely to choose a hybrid identity (i.e., "Asian/ethnic American"). Those experienced racial/ethnic discrimination are likely to withdraw from the identity that acknowledges their American-ness. Those who perceive a sense of shared culture among Asian groups are more likely to embrace the "Asian American" identity, all else being equal.

The significance of language in the integration process implies great technical difficulties for parties and candidates attempting to mobilize Asian Americans due to diverse languages used by various Asian groups. Perhaps most importantly, in order to create a coalition beyond ethnic divide, political parties and candidates have to cultivate Asians' perception of shared culture. As scholars predict, a minority coalition can only exist when a solid common ground is well established (Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2008).

Furthermore, it is important to understand the meaning of group identity in order to delineate its impact on political participation. If individual Asians passively accept the imposed label of "Asian American," the identity per se may not be as politically meaningful as if it is adopted actively and voluntarily. Such a possibility is illustrated by T.T.'s elaboration on her preference of "Chinese American" to "Asian American:"

> *Overall, I really like it (i.e., her Chinese American identity). I felt like it was a great opportunity for me to understand myself better, and my heritage. Like I said, with so many friends, we had so many things in common, it was almost uncanny. "Well, your parents did that too?" So it was very comforting in a lot of ways to*

find someone else who had been in that same setting. … I think that's (i.e., "Asian American") a label that non-Asians use. And so it becomes commonly accepted and used in survey and things you fill out that you are Asian Pacific Islanders group. But I don't really think that many of us thought of us Asian Americans first.

Another example is "American" A.Y. He enjoys sharing his cultural heritage (such as traditions, festivals, food, and being proud of his skill of using chopsticks), but his cultural identity does not bridge to his political orientations. If "Asian American" indicates only a vague and intangible label, the identity tells us little about its possessor. If there is no solid common ground for people with Asian descent to recognize and embrace, "Asian American" may become a popular but plain dish without unique flavor for Asians. Perhaps T.T.'s observation was sufficient to explain Asian Americans' lack of participation at the polls:

"Unfortunately, I would think another dominant character was that we weren't that much involved in other activities on campus. Most of us did three things: we studied, we hung out with other Chinese Americans, and most of us were pretty involved in either campus (religious) fellowship … or something like that. … We weren't politically active; we weren't even that active on campus fraternity or sorority or campus leadership, a few people did musical things, played in an orchestra. We all played in orchestra in high school, every person played violin or something, but by college, we weren't that committed, but still handful were still involved. But other than that, I would say that we weren't that involved in other activities."[77]

Without a commonly perceived collective body, each ethnic group forms only a small segment within the entire American population. Its political influence is inherently much more limited. Although Asians in the U.S. have made strides numerically, their sense of a panethnic community and of larger identity remains elusive. Recently, a growing number of Asian American political elites claim to see clear signs that Asians as a group are slowly beginning to

[77] T.T.'s quote also suggests the significance of socialization factors on the U.S.-born Asian Americans. Even though the U.S.-born grow up in the U.S., the political cues they receive (consciously or unconsciously) that are supplied by their parents may differ from those supplied in, for example, White households. The lack of political cues in these households may (or may not) explain why the U.S.-born Asians do not participate at the same rates of U.S.-born Whites.

coalesce (Lai 2011; Wildermuth 2011). In contrast, however, the data at hand show many Asian immigrants and their offspring remain rooted in ethnic identities (35% of the PNAAPS sample identified as "ethnic American" and 31% as "ethnic only.") The challenges to drawing Asians from different groups together range from language and religion to historical rivalries in the U.S. and in Asia.[78] Nevertheless, the findings also shine the light on the future political path for Asian Americans. As Asian Americans gradually grow in number, the number of associations or gatherings affiliated with Asians should increase, along with an attendant sense of commonality and identity. The most hopeful means for Asian American to achieve participatory and representational equality are to improve the awareness of their potential political influence and to band together to make their voice heard.

CONCLUSION

This chapter seeks to explain Asian American turnout by focusing on acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity. The main research hypotheses are that the more acculturated and those who feel more connected to the larger Asian community are more likely to show up at polls. The empirical analysis of the PNAAPS data presented in the pages suggest that a higher degree of residential stability, a sense of shared culture, identified as "Asian/ethnic American," the older, strong partisans and those who are interested in politics, and religious attendants are more likely to vote. On the other hand, the Asian-born are less likely to get out the vote. Given that the majority of Asians is foreign-born, low turnout among Asians in the U.S. comes as no surprise. This finding also helps explain lower turnout among Asian Americans despite their higher level of educational attainment at the group level.

In addition, both acculturation and group connectedness influence group identity choice. The use of English at home, residential stability, and a sense of shared Asian culture, are critical to fostering "Asian American" identity, while racial/ethnic discrimination experience hinder the

[78] "Asians Pursue a United State," Ryan Kim, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, 2001, August 2.

embracement of an identity that acknowledge one's American-ness. As observed, the foreign-born are less likely to see themselves as "American" or "Asian American." Comparisons of demographics between the U.S.-born and Asian-born highlight a few differences: the former has higher levels of socioeconomic status, is more residentially stable, tends to identify as "(ethnic) American," tend to be aware of their racial/ethnic discrimination experiences, and attend religious service less. These systemic differences between the two subgroups suggest underlying mechanism behind the status of being U.S.- or Asian-born.

Why does the baseline model fail to explain Asian American turnout rates at the group level? Because the majority of Asians in the U.S. that migrated from foreign lands are subject to the acculturation process. During this process, language, familiarity with the local political system, and residential stability present potential barriers to the formation of a new identity as well as the realization of their political power. Put another way, due to the prominence of foreign-born Asians in the U.S., acculturation and group connectedness factors may trump socioeconomic status in explaining the relatively low turnout among Asian Americans at the individual level.

In addition, the prevalence of educational achievement among Asian Americans may undermine the explanatory power of socioeconomic resources on political participation. Given the emphasis on educational and financial success in Asian cultures, and the limited social mobility in other avenues in American society, Asians are motivated to socially move upward via educational channel (Sue and Okazaki 1990).

Note that evidence presented here does not indicate that these factors only affect Asian American participation, but not other racial and ethnic groups. According to the literature, residential stability, discrimination experiences, and nativity obviously also influence White, African American, and Hispanic participation. My contribution is that these effects also are influential on Asian American political incorporation. Without available data comprised of substantial numbers of respondents from each racial and ethnic group, which engenders

meaningful comparisons by groups, the question of to what extent these factors yield various effects for each group awaits future research work.

Caveats aside, there is no doubt that how Asians view themselves matters to their political life. Little evidence yet supports the connection between individual and group interests and economic status among Asians in the U.S. Thus, a major question is whether or not the socioeconomic wellness prevents Asian Americans from coming together and perceiving a sense of linked fate between individuals and the broader community. Does it need to be conceptualized and measured differently for this group or subgroups, or is it simply irrelevant? For instance, how do experiences of Vietnamese fishermen in Louisiana after the 1975 immigration wave connect to those of Chinese railroad workers in California in the 1800's? Is it "good" or "bad" to have such connection? What is the political significance of such connection, if any?

In the hallowed "Declaration of Independence," Jefferson wrote, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights … That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed..." Clearly, to realize this "democratic" promise and to attain political equity, Asian Americans must rely on something besides socioeconomic resources. Developing a sense of group identity appears to be the most possible pathway to enhanced participation.

This possibility is evident not only in the quantitative data, but throughout in-depth interviews with Asian American citizens and elites. As W.L. puts it:

> *Asian Americans in the government needs to be addressed; having mentorship program, having ways …joining political campaigns, getting Asian American students interested in the political system so that we can influence the way our country works, so that we can help hopefully our own community but also learn the broader issues that affect our community and the United States as a whole, being able to see Asian Americans in the spotlight.*

Looking at the bigger picture, T.C. said:

I think the most important issue is power. … to create a United States in which people from any group can attain power, not because of where they're from or their race but because of the integrity of who they are.

At the participatory end of the equation, enhanced representation requires the development of attitudes and identities that foster activities such as voting, contributing money, attending meetings, and otherwise becoming engaged. The present data are consistent with the work of Dahl (1961) and others who highlight the role of social (a.k.a. "ethnic") identities in this developmental process. But another possibility is that political elites, and especially co-ethnic elites, can also facilitate this process. It is this possibility that animates the work of chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE: The Effect Of Racial And Ethnic Cues On Asian American Turnout

As outlined earlier, previous studies of the political participation of recent immigrant groups have emphasized the importance of socioeconomic status (SES) (Barreto and Munoz 2003), political socialization (Cho 1999; Barreto and Munoz 2003), political mobilization (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006) and group affinities (Lien et al. 2004; Lee 2008). Yet, Asian American political participation cannot be readily explained by these theories. Given the paradox of Asian American participation (or lack thereof) in light of their SES, in this chapter I examine the effect of racial and ethnic cues on Asian American turnout. Specifically, I investigate to what extent that descriptive representation theory holds for Asians?

Unsurprisingly, some Asian American voters interviewed for this study expressed an interest in seeing more Asian American representation in public arenas.[79] With low turnout rates, however, Asian Americans have little chance of getting immediate attention from political parties and candidates. Therefore, the real long-term question is: What political strategies might mobilize the Asian American community? More broadly, what extant conditions can motivate Asian Americans to go to the polls?

This chapter relies on an original survey-based experiment to answer the aforementioned questions. Of special interest is how Asian American candidates might affect Asian American voters. The existing literature finds that voters tend to vote for candidates who share similar sociological traits or backgrounds with the voters themselves. Scholars in racial and ethnic politics, for example, suggest that members of racial minorities tend to elect candidates who are like themselves (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Adler 2001; Gay 2001). Similar results, though somewhat uneven, are found in studies of gender and politics (Paolino

[79] Ages of participants interviewed range from 20 to 55.

1995; Gay and Tate 1998). The question of whether racial and ethnic cues effectively operate among Asian Americans at the individual level, however, is somewhat unanswered. This chapter, therefore, aims to provide data and analysis targeting this gap in the research.

The underlying motivation of this study is both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the means by which immigrant populations participate in American politics has been a central question for our discipline going back to the work of Dahl (1961) and, arguably, Tocqueville. Essentially, what intrigued political scientists is the process through which newcomers are integrated into their new political world. Practically, systemic legitimacy and perhaps party advantage depend on mobilizing these under-mobilized votes. The party politics literature points out that party system change in the U.S. depends largely on mobilization, rather than conversion (Carmines and Stimson 1981; Wanat and Burke 1982). Therefore, the basis upon which Asian American voters enter the political system will substantially define the next generation's party system. If party elites or operatives are looking for new political territory, their eyes should immediately go to Hispanics and Asians. And if Hispanics and Asians come to participate at rates commensurate with their growing presence in the population, the U.S. parties could look very different.

My structure here proceeds as follows: I first briefly review the concepts of political representation, and next outline the design of the experiment and working hypotheses. I then present, analyze, and discuss the results before considering the implications of the analysis for both future studies and practical politics.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Generally speaking, there are two types of political representation: descriptive and substantive representation. In this study, I define descriptive representation as the representation of Asian American voters by candidates (or officials) with Asian ancestry. Substantive representation refers to the representation of the Asian community's interests and needs in the

decision-making process, regardless of the representative's racial or ethnic background. The former (which is the focus of this chapter) has a symbolic nature, while the latter is defined by policy references that favor the community. In addition, I posit that the possibility of descriptive representation—that is, the presence of an Asian American candidate on the ballot—serves as a mobilizing agent for Asian American voters. This chapter thus aims to measure the causal relationship between conceptions of political representation among Asian Americans and turnout at the individual level.

Descriptive representation theory predicts the group prefers to elect representatives who share their race, ethnicity, and other background characteristics. Note that the conceptualization of descriptive representation here is slightly different from that of "political empowerment." Bobo and Gilliam (1990) define political empowerment as "the extent to which a group *has achieved* significant representation and influence in political decision making" (378) (emphasis added). Political empowerment refers to the impact of *elected officials* on voters' political orientations and/or behavior. The experiment analyzed below tests the explanatory power of descriptive representation theory for Asian turnout intent, but does not measure or test political empowerment.

The basic psychological mechanism posits that the racial and ethnic cues will help voters to make their decisions. Voters will use the cues to infer things about the candidate. If a voter does not know much about the election, when she sees one of the contestants is Asian, she will feel that the candidate probably is similar to herself, or infer that the candidate values what she values and shares her interests and needs as well as policy stands. With a hint of likely policy responsiveness, the desire for descriptive representation encourages voters to get involved with an election in which a coethnic (or panethnic) candidate is running for the office. Although descriptive representation may also drive vote choice, my focus here tests whether the appearance of a coethnic candidate on the ballot elevates Asian American voters' turnout. The theoretical perspective leads to the following working hypothesis:

H1: Asian American voters turnout at higher rates when an Asian American candidate contests the office, especially when (a) the Asian American candidate is coethnic, and/or (b) the Asian American candidate's ethnic tie is long standing or generational.

Note the presumption that, if the voters are less informed or engaged in politics, then racial and ethnic cues are more useful. This is especially true when cues explicitly tie the candidate to the voter's own ethnic group (i.e., coethnic candidates), and/or when the ethnic bond inferred from the cue is long standing—making the candidate's connection with the voter's own ethnic group more promising and credible. In other words, these information shortcuts probably do not operate universally among all individuals. After all, people only react to political events to the extent that they are aware of political affairs (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). More to the point, there are many studies demonstrating that most voters do not have a consistent and sophisticated political ideology, and therefore rely on shortcuts when asked to register an opinion about politics (Popkin 1994, Lupia 1994). Put plainly, if voters do not have sufficient information to make a decision, racial and ethnic cues will come in especially handy, but for those who are more politically engaged, racial and ethnic cues are merely one more piece of factual information. The reasoning leads to the second hypothesis:

H2: Racial and ethnic cues operate with particular effectiveness among those who are previously less engaged in politics.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

To estimate how racial and ethnic cues affect turnout, I employed a survey-based experiment. The purpose of the experiment design is to address two questions: First, does the appearance of Asian American candidates on the ballot matter to Asian voters? Second, can coethnic candidates, compared to non-Asian candidates, more effectively motivate voters to the polls?

The main treatment is the ethnicity of the candidate, with effect being gauged by turnout intent. First, I offered four treatment statements included a candidate with Asian descent,

including two statements with a Chinese American candidate (Chen) and two with Asian Indian American candidate (Iyengar). The other statement, presented to the control group, included two candidates with common American names (William Jones and James Anderson).

The Asian American candidates' names are designed to maximize the possibility that respondents can quickly identify their ethnicities. The Chinese American candidate is "Andrew Chen," and the Asian Indian American candidate is "Sahil Iyengar." According to the Asian surname list compiled by Lauderdale and Kestenbaum (2000), Chen is the second most common Chinese surname conditional on available racial information. The last name "Iyengar" appeared 547 times in the 2000 Census data.[80] More than 93% of those whose surname was "Iyengar" self-identified as "Non-Hispanic Asian and Pacific Islander Only."[81]

Secondly, to push the experiment further, I also include an additional treatment in which the national origin of the candidate's parents is stated in order to explore the impact of additional, credible ethnic priming. For each pair of treatment statements in which an Asian candidate was running, one stated the national origin of the Asian American candidate's parents, and the other did not. The statement of the control group did not mention the national origin of either candidate's parents.

The logic here is simple. I designed the candidate's name as an ethnic cue, and used the national origin of the candidate's parents to strengthen (or highlight) the connection between the candidate and a specific ethnic group. The second treatment is particularly useful because even if voters cannot recognize the ethnic background of the surnames, parental origin explicitly ties the candidate to that specific group. It also deepens the connection of the candidate to the particular nationality, which could lead to a greater sense of connection with voters sharing that nationality. In other words, the second treatment ensures the availability of the candidate's ethnic cue to voters. To validate the experimental design, I also conducted a manipulation check to test whether the fictional candidate names provide the expected racial and ethnic cues to participants.

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[80] There is no evidence showing that "Iyengar" is more popular among Muslims or Hiduism.

[81] Source: http://names.mongabay.com/data/i/IYENGAR.html. (Last Access Date: March 24, 2010)

In a pilot study with a manipulation check of 89 respondents recruited on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin, 74% were able to identify Andrew Chen's ethnicity as Chinese, 86% were able to identify James Anderson as White, while 54% were able to recognize Sahil Iyengar as Asian Indian. Results of the pilot study indicates that respondents thought Andrew Chen and Sahil Iyengar was more interested in serving the Asian American community than James Anderson (statistically significant at the 0.05 level).[82] In summary, the designed treatment succeeded in manipulating the candidates' perceived ethnic backgrounds by varying their names.

Participants were recruited either through email lists of several on-campus Asian American associations (for instance, the Center of Asian American Studies, Asian American Round Table, and Vietnamese Students Association) [83] or flyers posted on campus. The entire questionnaire was computer-based and took approximately 15 minutes to complete. Each subject was given $10 upon the completion of the questionnaire for his or her time and efforts. In total, 300 subjects were successfully recruited and completed the survey.

When participants arrived at the Behavioral Lab in the Department of Government at UT-Austin, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the five groups and presented a distinct statement about a hypothetical city council election featuring two candidates was presented. As indicated earlier, each statement was identical with the exception of two factors: the candidates' names and their parental origin. Three reasons justify using a city council election in the statement. First, Hispanic and Asian American voters are more likely to vote for candidates who share their racial and ethnic backgrounds in local elections (Hajnal and Troustine 2005). Due to

[82] Another potential racial and ethnic hint presented in the statement is the name of the law firm associated with each candidate. Respondents were asked to evaluate the interest of the named law firm in serving the Asian American community using a 0-10 scale. On average, participants rated the "Wang Law Firm" as having a higher interest in serving the Asian American community than the "LLC Law Firm" (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). This may contribute to the high level of turnout intent of the control group in the fictional city council election compared to the national level. However, comparisons of likely turnout between the control group and other groups show no evidence that the Wang law firm's name has elevated turnout among treatment groups.

[83] Other associations contacted include Asian sororities and fraternities, and religious groups such as Asian American Campus Ministry.

residential concentration, racial and ethnic minorities have a better chance to elect one of their own to local offices than to federal ones. Second, in order to provide plausible scenarios without invoking suspicion, I use local elections, which usually receive less attention than federal elections. Third, while political parties no doubt play a role in national elections, candidates have more leeway in running local campaigns.[84] The aforementioned conditions jointly allow me to offer a realistic yet compelling situation with which to gauge participants' reactions.

[Table 5-1 about here]

The experimental components were embedded within the Asian American Political Attitudes and Behavior Survey conducted at the University of Texas at Austin from March 3 to March 26, 2009.[85] Table 5-1 presents the complete experiment design, and Appendix C shows the exact wording of the statements.

Immediately after the inserted statement, respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of voting (on a zero to ten scale) if the election were held tomorrow. The scale runs from 0, which is "definitely *would not* vote," to 10, which is "definitely *would* vote." The actual average was almost exactly in the middle (the average is 5.27 with a standard error 0.17). The choice of a zero-to-ten scale rather than a dichotomous measure is based on the advantage of measuring variation in intention of voting.

THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC CUES ON ASIAN TURNOUT INTENT

The results offer variable support for each of the hypotheses tested. All told, each treatment effectively boosts turnout when compared to the control group, and this impact is especially prominent among the less politically engaged. There are, however, some caveats. When an Asian American candidate's name is on the ballot, the likelihood of voting is always higher than for the control group, although the differences are not large.

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[84] While some may suggest that providing party affiliations of the fictional candidates can make the scenario even more realistic, I on purpose omit this piece of information to control for the effect of partisanship.

[85] The survey was briefly interrupted by the 2009 spring break March 16-21.

Turnout averages are as follows: Chen, 5.07 (with a standard error 0.39); Chen with parents from China, 5.46 (s.e.=0.35); Iyengar, 5.17 (s.e.=0.38); Iyengar with parents from India, 6.03 (s.e.=0.34); Control Group, 4.63 (s.e.=0.39). Thus, only the Iyengar with parents from India treatment emerges as statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

To gain leverage on the question of whether the treatment at large affects turnout, I break the groups into three categories by treatment. In so doing, the effects of candidate name and parental origin become more evident (Figure 5-1). The average likely turnout of those who see an Asian candidate running for the city council election is 5.12 (s.e. 0.27). It rises to 5.75 (s.e. 0.24) for those who not only know an Asian candidate is running, but also the candidate's explicit connection to their own ethnic groups (F=3.37, $p < 0.05$, n=296). Each treatment results in a statistically and substantively significant turnout increase (at least 10 percentage points). More notably, those who were exposed to the Asian candidate and information about his parents' nationality were 24 percentage points more likely to vote than those in the control group.

[Figure 5-1 About Here]

By design, the fictional candidates are either Chinese or Asian Indian. One may also ask whether voters extend their support for a coethnic candidate to someone outside of their own group. To answer this question, I focus on Chinese and Asian Indian participants, respectively.

The pattern among Chinese American participants is mostly suggestive (the left panel of Figure 5-2). Chinese participants appeared to need clear ethnic cues to act. Only when Chinese participants (n=61) knew that Chen's parents were from China did they become more likely to vote. Furthermore, there was no such reaction to the Indian candidate, Iyengar.

Coethnic enthusiasm is stronger among Asian Indian participants (n=90). Their likely turnout is higher when Iyengar is running for the office (6.71, s.e. 0.63) even if they were not yet told that his parents were from India, compared to when both candidates are non-Asian (4.89, s.e. 0.74). When Indian participants knew that Iyengar's parents were from India, their turnout intent was dramatically higher (7.29, s.e. 0.45). The substantive effect is a 49-percentage point increase in the probability of turning out to vote (easily significant at the 0.05 statistical level).

Similarly, coethnic and cross-ethnic effects are noticeable among Asian Indians. Asian Indian turnout is 11-percentage points higher when Iyengar was on the ballot compared to Chen (coethnic effect; comparing the "Chen" bar to the "Iyengar" bar in Figure 5-2). On the other hand, Asian Indian turnout is 24-percentage points higher when Chen is running compared to the control group (cross-ethnic effect; comparing the "Chen" bar to the "Iyengar" bar). Interestingly, when Indian participants learned that Iyengar's parents were from India, their likely turnout declined.[86] In short, Indian participants react more to Iyengar than to Chen; but when Chen runs for the office, Asian Indians are still more likely to vote than when a non-Asian candidate is running. The aforementioned findings suggest some complex interaction between the candidates' and voters' ethnicity in explaining Asian turnout. To examine these possible interactions, I extend the analysis to consider both voters' and candidates' ethnicities.

[Figure 5-2 About Here]

Our matched pairs (i.e. Chinese participants who saw Chen on the ballot, and Indian participants who saw Iyengar on the ballot) have a much higher turnout level (6.39, s.e. 0.19, n=71) than the non-matched pairs (4.92, s.e. 0.32, n=225). Put another way, a coethnic candidate increases turnout likelihood by 30 percentage points (t=3.90, p <.001). Conversely, there is little turnout effect among non-coethnics. To say that Asian Americans will not be able to form a panethnic coalition is undoubtedly an overstatement, but there is little supportive evidence for this possibility either. The lukewarm reaction of Asians in Austin to non-coethnic candidates[87] contrasts with Collet's (2005) finding on panethnic (or corss-ethnic) support among Vietnamese in Little Saigon. One plausible explanation focuses on the extent to which commonality within the community has been developed. In California, for example, the length of Asian residency, residential stability, and the growth of the Asian population in particular locales, the

[86] One plausible explanation is the international relations between Asian India and China. However, evidence drawn from the data is not sufficient to determine the hypothesis.

[87] Vietnamese turnout, in the Austin sample, was not affected by the treatment.

commonality of Asian groups within certain community are probably better established. Thus, panethnic (or cross-ethnic) support for non-coethnic candidates is more likely to take place.[88]

[Figure 5-3 About Here]

To test whether the effect of ethnic cues on turnout varies by attentiveness and interest, I first measured levels of engagement. In the survey, respondents were asked to check all types of political activities they took part in the past four years. Most respondents had only voted in primaries (27%) or general elections (58%). Still, one third (31%) joined in a political meeting or rally, and one fifth (20%) was involved in campaign fundraising (Figure 5-4). One's level of political engagement is measured by summing up participation in various political activities, ranging from 0 (participating in no political activity in the past four years) to 7 (participating in all types of political activities listed)[89] (Figure 5-5). Among the 300 participants, roughly one third (29%) did not participate in any political activities over the last election cycle, while another quarter (26%) only took part in one, less than one fifth (17%) joined two, only about one in ten (14%) participated in three, and the remaining 15% of the sample participated in four or more.[90] The "less politically engaged" are those whose participation level is below the average (1.70 with a standard deviation of 1.64), while those whose participation level is above the average are the "more politically engaged." Put another way, the more politically engaged were those who participated in more than one type of political activities in the last presidential election cycle, and the less politically engaged were those who participated in only one kind of political activity or less previously. In general, the self-reported turnout probability of the more politically engaged (5.83, s.e. 0.24, n=136) was higher than that of the less politically engaged (4.81, s.e. 0.22, n=164). This unsurprising difference was significant at the 0.01 level.

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[88] On the other hand, if members of one single ethnic group make up the local Asian community, the established ethnic enclave may constrain the operation of panethnic effect.

[89] Political activities include fundraising and campaign donation, political meeting or rally, demonstration, contacting with officers or representatives, contacting editors of newspapers, voting in primaries, and voting in general elections.

[90] Due to the randomization, not surprisingly, the average level of political participation is not related to the treatment.

[Figure 5-4 About Here]

[Figure 5-5 About Here]

More importantly, controlling for engagement lends support to the claim that the effect of ethnic cues is especially prominent among the less politically engaged (Figure 5-6). The pattern observed among the less politically active is self-explanatory (the left panel of Figure 5-6): compared to seeing two Anglo candidates on the ballot, the turnout probability was higher among those Asian American respondents who saw either Chen or Iyengar running for the city council election (+0.32), and an explicit ethnic tie with Chen or Iyengar increased the turnout even higher (+1.39). The treatment effects, however, disappear among the more politically engaged (the right panel of Figure 5-6). In fact, ethnic cues allow the less engaged Asian Americans to overcome turnout differentials with more engaged Asian Americans. The left panel of Figure 5-6 shows that less engaged Asians rate their turnout likelihood at 5.52 after seeing an article about a coethnic candidate; this exceeds the 5.14 likelihood estimated among more engaged control group respondents.

[Figure 5-6 About Here]

In sum, there are three main findings in this chapter. First, Asian Americans show a tendency to value descriptive representation. Secondly, not only do ethnic cues operate effectively among Asian American voters, but this effect is particularly strong among the less politically engaged. Lastly, the effectiveness of ethnic cues may (or may not) suggest some difficulties for panethnic or even cross-ethnic coalitions among Asian Americans. The data show differences in Chinese turnout for Chen versus Chinese turnout for Iyengar. Similar differences exist among Indians respondents. Clearly, there is a little less enthusiasm for a non-coethnic (albeit panethnic) candidate. As Kaufmann (2003) suggests, the essence of a strong coalition is a well-developed common ground among the allies (e.g., the occasional "non-White" commonality among African Americans and Latinos) even though sometimes the perception of "commonality" can be non-reciprocal (McClain et al. 2003). A common ground on which

different Asian ethnicities can come together in the political arena is, as of yet, somewhat elusive.

CONCLUSION

While the existing literature largely confirms the descriptive representation theory among African Americans, Hispanics, and females, the effect of ethnic cues among Asians at the individual level is understudied. The data presented here suggest Asian Americans also value descriptive representation. The empirical analysis focuses on a survey-based experiment involving a fictional city council election. Two treatments are inserted into a news story, one varying the main candidate's ethnicity and the other varying information about the main candidate's parents' nationality. Both the candidate's Asian-sounding surname and the national origin of his parents significantly increase turnout among Asian voters. At the same time, effects vary by the voters' ethnicities, with a stronger turnout effect associated with coethnic candidates.

The effectiveness of ethnic cues among Asian Americans suggest that the lack of these cues may have contributed to their low level of turnout. In addition, ethnic cues are especially effective among the less politically engaged. Information shortcuts are particularly useful for those who do not frequently follow up with politics. As a result, the less politically engaged make decisions based on eye-catching cues. This poses a challenge for Asian American political elites. In order to win elections, Asian American candidates not only need to appeal to Asian voters, but also to non-Asian voters as well. Inevitably, the need to mobilize coethnics may conflict with the need to broaden the appeal of Asian American candidates.

These findings and their political implications should not be taken unconditionally. The first caveat is one shared by all laboratory experimental studies. The survey was conducted in Austin and in a university facility, which inevitably attracted a sample of relatively young, liberal-leaning, well educated, more affluent, and more U.S.-born Asian Americans. The lack of variation in age and education limited the capacity of the study to investigate the impacts of

socioeconomic status and demographics on political participation within the Asian American community. On the other hand, the Austin sample has obvious merits. Initially, drawing the Austin sample from a college population controls for the effects of age and socioeconomic status. In addition, the sample (better educated and higher income) mirrors the relatively high achievement levels of Asian Americans at the group level.

Furthermore, using an experimental design and a hypothetical political scenario enables the study to control for spurious relationships. The experimental data, nonetheless, limit the researchers' ability to go beyond the hypothetical situation. In reality, political candidates and campaign strategists engage in a number of activities in response to a variety of constantly changing circumstances. In addition, Asians that voluntarily affiliate themselves with an Asian association may be more sensitive to ethnic cues than the general Asian American population. Have said all this, the experimental data at hand clearly offer some insight into symbolic representation among Asian Americans that ought to inform future studies.

CHAPTER SIX: Summary And Conclusions

In March 2011 the U.S. Census Bureau released the 2010 overview of race and Hispanic origin. The brief highlighted opposing trends in the population distribution: although non-Hispanic Whites were still the largest racial/ethnic group, they have the slowest growth rate, while the Hispanic and Asian populations are growing considerably, partially due to relatively high levels of immigration (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). Yet, political commentators and scholars have long-noted the lukewarm political participation rates among Hispanics and Asian Americans (Ramos 2004; Kim 2007; Barreto 2010; Lai 2011; Lee and Hajnal 2011). Unfortunately, we do not know much about why these groups "under-achieve" politically, nor can we offer much of a plan for improvement, if desired. We thus know that the electoral landscape has changed over the last decade, but our understanding of how these fast growing electorates can be politically engaged has some catching-up to do.

LESSONS LEARNED: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The relatively high levels of socioeconomic status among Asian Americans at the group level and their low levels of participation puzzle political scientists. The introduction of this dissertation notes this conundrum. Essentially, the project seeks to develop and test theoretically motivated research hypotheses with an eye towards the practical politics of mobilization. The process by which immigrant populations incorporate into the political system has been one of the central themes in our discipline. Practically, systemic legitimacy and perhaps party advantage depend on mobilizing the peripheral electorates.

I began this dissertation by asking some basic questions. What explains Asian American political participation, since the prediction of the socioeconomic model is off the mark? How do these experiences affect their political incorporation? To what extent do individuals feel connected to the larger community? Does a sense of group connectedness elevate Asian turnout? Does their group identities that acknolwledge both their American-ness and Asian-ness/ethnicity effectively motivate individuals to participate in politics? How do Asian American acculturation experiences influence their views of themselves? Can the appearance of Asian American candidates on the ballot sufficient to energize Asian American voters? Does the effect of ethnic cues prevail among all Asian Americans?

As outlined in Chapter two, my consideration of Asian American political participation has pursued two directions. I first explore the causes of Asian American turnout, with a focus on acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group identity. Furthermore, I examine factors of group identity formation. I then further investigate how ethnic cues affect Asian American turnout. My main argument is that the more acculturated Asian Americans are, the more likely they are to participate in American politics. In addition, those who embrace both their American-ness and Asian-ness/ethnicity in their identities are more likely to take part in the political process. Tag along the same line, the presence of racial and ethnic cues (or a lack thereof) on the political stage may help us understand Asian turnout in the United States.

The Asian American population is largely comprised mainly of immigrants, for whom the adaptation and adjustment to the U.S. is an ongoing process. This implies two things. First, the general political socialization experiences we expect in non-Hispanic White households are not necessarily taking place in Asian American homes. Second, their acculturation experiences—which involve interacting and negotiating with the

present society—help to update their behavioral repertoire by defining their roles and social positions. New identities are developed that ultimately influence political behavior. The significance of acculturation experiences and group identity in understanding Asian American political participation suggests that ethnic cues are important for the Asian American community. The question is, to what extent?

The second argument pursued in this dissertation is that Asian American voters' turnout rates will be higher when Asian American candidates run for an office. Presumably, the underlying mechanism is that ethnic cues provide a hint of possible policy responsiveness or promise resulting in an elevated turnout rate. This is especially true among those who are less politically engaged. In short, the presence of Asian American candidate can conditionally energize Asian American voters.

Chapter 3 examines the demographic and political contour of the Asian American population. The comparisons of educational attainment, income, and turnout rates with other groups demonstrate the central puzzle of the project: how can a such well-off group be so apolitical? The size of the foreign-born population within the Asian American community, and the focus of Asian American on economic and education (i.e., non-political) achievements help us understand the disconnection between prediction and the reality. In particular, the gap of education and income effects on turnout between Whites and Asians becomes more noticeable among the better educated and the wealthier. After taking nativity (i.e., U.S.-born status) into consideration, the difference of socioeconomic status effects appears to exist between the U.S.- and foreign-born populations, but not within the U.S.- or foreign-born populations.

The empirical analysis of Chapter 4 examines the effect of acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group identity on Asian American turnout using the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey data (conducted by Lien, Conway,

and Wong) supplemented with in-depth interviews. Despite the heterogeneity of historical paths and cultural practices, different Asian ethnic groups are largely viewed as one bloc. The analysis of logit regression models shows that length of residency (or residential stability), shared culture perceptions, "Asian/ethnic American" identity, age, political interest, partisan strength, and religious attendance increase the turnout rate. On the other hand, the Asian-born status decreases the probability of voting. In other words, the findings lend support to the acculturation and group identity hypotheses that these factors have influence on turnout among Asian Americans.

Furthermore, a closer look at group identity formation reveals effects of acculturation experiences and group connectedness on group identity. The former facilitates one's embracement of American-ness as well as Asian-ness/ethnicity, while the latter tends to further highlight individual's unique race/ethnicity. English proficiency in general increases the likelihood of acknowledging one's American-ness in her identity. Residential stability helps to foster a hybrid identity such as "Asian/ethnic American." A sense of shared culture only has a positive impact on the formation of "Asian American" identity. On the other hand, racial/ethnic discrimination experiences tend to discourage Asian Americans from embracing their American-ness.

The significance of being Asian-born begs for further examination. Comparisons of demographics between the U.S.-born and Asian-born populations highlight certain systemic differences. The U.S.-born Asians tend to be more residentially stable, more aware of their racial/ethnic discrimination experiences, slightly more likely to perceive cultural commonality among Asians, view themselves as "(ethnic) American," have higher levels of socioeconomic status, and attend religious services less. In addition, in-depth interviews with Asian American voters, activists, and elites conducted for the project in the Austin area, TX, reveal that although one's "Asian American" or "ethnic

American" identity may denote cultural practices, it does not necessarily connote political needs and interests. A pan-Asian coalition is not impossible, but it looks to be a considerable challenge.

While Chapter 4 focuses on the roles of acculturation and group identity in understanding Asian American turnout, Chapter 5 directly tests the impact of ethnic cues on turnout for Asian American subgroups. To control for spurious relationships, an experiment was conducted on the University of Texas at Austin campus with a fictional city council election in which two candidates were presented to respondents: one had an Asian surname (and, in some treatments, parents from Asia) while the other did not. The analysis of the experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of ethnic cues on Asian American turnout, especially when the ethnic ties of the Asian American candidate are augmented by the candidate's parental origin. In other words, the presence of an Asian American candidate on the ballot can successfully mobilize Asian American voters. This effect is conditioned by the voters' previous political engagement. For those who were less politically engaged, the effect of ethnic cues on turnout is more prominent; moreover, the clearer the ethnic tie of the Asian American candidate to a specific group is, the more effective the cues are. With ethnic cues, less politically engaged Asian American voters might even participate at the polls at the same level as the more politically engaged. Among the more politically engaged, however, ethnic cues do not produce such effect on turnout. Furthermore, the results also present a challenge in that mobilization effects are limited for cross-ethnic groups, while there is no doubt that Chinese Americans are eager to vote for a Chinese American candidate, there is no evidence that (for example) Vietnamese or Korean Americans share the enthusiasm.

FORGING AHEAD: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

It is worth noting that the findings presented here are relevant to the future of the American party system. In the run-up to the 2012 election, the media and political commentators have speculated about the possibility that the Republican nominee could select an Asian American vice-presidential candidate. Both South Carolina Governor Nikki Hayley and Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal have drawn substantial attention, and each could be a major player beyond 2012.[91] The appeal of these candidates is, in part, due to their presumed appeal to the burgeoning Asian American electorate. The potential for Asian American voters on the national stage has already been previewed in local elections. For instance, "Asian alone" or in combination made up 58% and 55% of the entire populations of Daly City (in San Mateo County) and the City of Fremont (in Alameda County), respectively (Jones 2011).[92]

This project is not, of course, a handbook for Asian American mobilization. Instead, it seeks to provide a window into the political incorporation of the Asian American community. To contextualize the findings of the present project into the broader literature, I realize there are more gaps to fill. While the descriptive outline of the Asian American population in chapter 3 and empirical analysis of national data in chapter 4, the residential clustering of Asian American households begs for further investigation at the more local levels. As some scholars note, local ethnic-based organization and

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[91] Bobby Jindal not only was suspected to be Senator McCain's running mate in the 2008 presidential election, upon his quick endorsement on Texas Governor Perry's short-lived presidential candidacy, reporters immediately inquired the possibility of him running for the 2012 presidential election as well as vice-presidential position. For instance, see "Meet the Press" moderated by David Gregory (available at http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bobby-jindal-rules-out-2012-presidential-run-but-vp-is-possibility/) (last date of access: March 12, 2012), and report about Jindal's victory on the 2011 gubernatorial reelection (available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/23/us-usa-election-louisiana-idUSTRE79M07V20111023) (Last date of access: March 12, 2012).

[92] The report is available at http://www.apiidv.org/files/2010Census-WHIAAPI-2011.pdf. (Last date of access: March 12, 2012)

media are important conditions for the electoral success of ethnic candidates (Barreto 2010; Lai 2011). One additional question, then, is "what are the catalysts that propel or motivate these organizations and media to arise?" Perhaps more controversially, does the relative similarity of socioeconomic resources between Asian Americans and Whites predict a possible political coalition between the two groups? Or will Asian Americans politically become allies of African Americans and/or Hispanics?[93]

Chapter 4 suggests that acculturation experiences indeed have an impact on political participation and group identity formation. But we still do not know what being an "Asian American" or "ethnic American" or "American" means to individuals in social and/or political terms. One of the interview participants stated that while he embraced cultural practices such as using chopsticks skillfully, he insisted that when it came to politics, he was "American" rather than "Asian American."[94] Does the identity "Asian American" have the same meaning for someone who resides in California (with its higher concentration of Asian Americans) as for another individual who lives in Texas (with a growing Asian American population) or Alabama (where Asians are 1% of the state population[95])? Or should scholars disentangle the effect of acculturation on political participation on specific ethnic group (e.g., Vietnamese, Chinese), instead of treating Asians in America as a panethnic group, given each group's historical trajectory? To an extreme, is "Asian American" even politically meaningful to Asian Americans at all?

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[93] In an unpublished manuscript, my coauthor and I find that African Americans are less likely to form a coalition with Asian Americans, but Asian Americans do not view African Americans as an unlikely partner, using the 2005 Intergroup Relations survey conducted for the National Conference for Community Justice.

[94] Similarly, while some celebrated the success of Jeremy Lin, others worried that the stereotype of Asians continued to linger in sports (see NPR report at http://www.npr.org/2012/02/16/146994147/op-ed-linsanity-is-thrilling-yet-frustrating) (last date of access: March 12, 2012) and current sitcoms (for example, see NPR report at http://www.npr.org/2012/02/24/147221312/for-asians-and-latinos-stereotypes-persist-in-sitcoms) (last date of access: March 12, 2012).

[95] The figures are calculated among those who reported one race only.

Unlike African Americans (with shared memory of slavery) and Hispanics (with shared language), Asian Americans, may not be similar enough to develop a coherent panethnic identity?

In addition, while chapter 4 emphasizes acculturation experiences, what happens to second-generation Asian American households? The parents and their children are both U.S.-born. Does that imply the increasing significance of socialization experiences in these homes? Given the changes in immigration and naturalization laws in the twenty-first century, the composition of the Asian and Hispanic populations likely will change, with an increasing proportion of U.S.-born descendants and a decreasing number of immigrants. With the size of second- and later-generation immigrants grows, will the positive impact of shared culture on "Asian American" identity and turnout (indicated in this dissertation) fade away?

Lastly, the effect of ethnic cues illustrated in chapter 5 deserves extension beyond the laboratory. In the experiment, two major candidates were designed to be almost identical and a single statement was the only information provided to participants. However, campaigns in real time usually involve more than a one-time message or activity, and contrasts between competing candidates can be easily drawn from the news. Asian American voters expressing a bit of enthusiasm for an Asian American candidate is one thing; non-Asian American voters' reaction to this Asian American candidate may be quite another. Given the size of Asian American electorates, the electoral success of Asian American candidate must rely on multiracial coalitions, which necessitates developing common ground, such as minority status, immigration and language policies (Kaufmann 2003a; Lai 2011).

A decade after the conclusion of Lai, Cho, Kim, and Takeda (2001) that "the literature had little to say about the relationship between politically organized Asian

Americans and external strategic political elites," this project offers a few small steps forward for understanding the complex issues of Asian American politics. The puzzles and other questions raised by the present project, however, deserve further investigation. Researchers continue to investigate the means by which immigrant populations incorporate into American political system. The growth of the Asian American electorate, as well as the emergence of political elites with Asian descents, has captured more public attention and scholarly interest since the turn of the twenty-first century. There is no doubt that Asian American population is still smaller than that of Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. Yet, the relevance and potential of Asian Americans in American politics is unquestionable.

Appendices

APPENDIX A RESULTS OF BASELINE MODEL BY RACE AND ETHNICITY

	Asian Americans	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Education	.18 (.02)***	.32 (.01)***	.24 (.02)***	.19 (.01)***
Income	.05 (.01)***	.10 (.003)***	.08 (.01)***	.08 (.01)***
Gender (Male)	-.15 (.09)	-.23 (.02)***	-.60 (.07)***	-.19 (.06)**
Age < 30	-.28 (.12)*	-.64 (.03)***	-.47 (.08)***	-.52 (.07)***
Age ≥65	.47 (.14)**	.95 (.03)***	.54 (.11)***	.83 (.11)***
Nativity (U.S.-born)	.37 (.10)***	.65 (.07)***	.47 (.16)**	-.31 (.08)***
Constant	-7.85 (.73)***	-13.20 (.23)***	-8.78 (.65)***	-7.45 (.45)***
N	2206	53875	5937	5088
P	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001
-2log-likelihood	2756.93	50759.16	5298.02	6233.92
Pseudo R^2	.07	.14	.10	.09

Source: The 2008 Current Population Survey.

Note: Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regression with standard errors in parentheses.

***: $p < .001$, **: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$

APPENDIX B DEMOGRAPHICS OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

ID	Age	Gender	Education	Occupation
C1	41	F	MA	Homemaker
C2	30	F	BA	Homemaker
C3	29	M	MA	Program Specialist
C4	34	M	MA	Grad Student
C5	24	M	BA	Software engineer
C6	31	M	BA	Grad Student
C7	26	M	BA	Grad Student
C8	32	M	JD	Attorney
C9	31	M	BA	Software engineer
C10	55	F	Ph.D	Administrator
C11	28	M	JD	Lawyer
C12	31	F	MS	Librarian
C13	20	M	High School graduated	College student
C14	38	M	MA	Lecturer and writer
J1	25	F	MA	Graduate Student
C16	NA	F	Ph.D	Retired Official

APPENDIX C SCRIPTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL STATEMENTS

Group	In an election for city council, there are two candidates for the position, ...[insert treatment] ... In addition to the similar backgrounds, [Candidate A] and [Candidate B] in fact also share their views on education, immigration reform, social services, as well as issues related to economic growth. Both claim to represent the best interests of the district.
Chen, China	Andrew Chen and James Anderson. Andrew Chen was born in Houston, Texas. Both of Andrew's parents came to the United States in 1965 from Mainland China. Two years later, Andrew was born on July 8, 1967. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Andrew has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The other candidate, James Anderson, who was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas. Both of James' parents were born in the United States. James earned his J.D. in 1992 and currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin.
Chen	Andrew Chen and James Anderson. Andrew Chen was born on July 8, 1967, in Houston, Texas. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Andrew has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas. James earned his J.D. in 1992 and currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin.
Iyengar, India	Sahil Iyengar and James Anderson. Sahil was born in Houston, Texas. Both of Sahil's parents came to the United States from Asian India in 1965. Two years later, Sahil was born on July 8, 1967. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Sahil has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned his J.D. in 1992. Both of James' parents were born in the United States. James currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin.
Iyengar	Sahil Iyengar and James Anderson. Sahil Iyengar was born on July 8, 1967, in Houston, Texas. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Sahil has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned his J.D. in 1992. James Anderson currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin.
Control	William Jones and James Anderson. William was born on July 8, 1967, in Houston, Texas. After earning his J.D. in 1995, William has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. James Anderson was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned his J.D. in 1992. James Anderson currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin.

Tables and Figures

Table 3-1 The Composition of Adult Citizens in the United States

	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Others
2000	78	12	7	3	0
2002	76	12	8	3	1
2004	75	12	8	3	2
2006	74	12	9	3	2
2008	73	12	9	3	3

Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in cells are percentages of raw numbers divided by numbers of adult citizens in the United States.

Table 3-2 Demographics by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2008

	White (Non-Hispanic)	Black (Alone)	Hispanic (of all races)	Asian (Alone)	U.S. (Total)
By Gender					
.Male	48	44	49	47	48
.Female	52	56	51	53	52
By Education					
.Less than 9th grade	2	3	11	6	3
.9th to 12th grade, no diploma	6	13	14	4	8
.High school graduate	31	37	33	19	32
.Some college/associate's	30	30	29	24	30
.Bachelor's degree	20	12	10	31	18
.Advanced degree	10	5	4	16	9
By Family Income					
.Less than $10,000	2	8	5	1	3
.$10,000 to $14,999	2	6	5	2	3
.$15,000 to $19,999	2	5	4	1	3
.$20,000 to $29,999	7	11	13	6	8
.$30,000 to $39,999	8	12	13	6	9
.$40,000 to $49,999	7	8	9	7	7
.$50,000 to $74,999	19	15	17	15	18
.$75,000 to $99,999	13	8	9	11	12
.$100,000 to $149,999	13	5	8	16	11
.$150,000 and over	9	3	4	13	8
Median Family Income[a]	54698	33255	34397	59324	50046
By Citizenship Attainment					
.U.S. Born	97	94	74	38	93
.Naturalized	3	6	26	62	7

Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in cells are percentages of raw numbers divided by numbers of adult citizens, except for median family income.

[a] The 1999 Census Data.

Table 3-3 Voting Rates in the 2008 Presidential Election by Demographics

	White (Non-Hispanic)	Black (Alone)	Hispanic (of all races)	Asian (Alone)	U.S. (Total)
All	66	65	50	48	64
By Gender					
.Male	64	61	48	48	62
.Female	68	68	52	48	66
By Education					
.Less than 9th grade	37	46	39	28	38
.9th-12th grade, no diploma	38	50	35	25	40
.High school graduate	56	61	40	32	55
.Some college/associate's	69	71	61	47	68
.Bachelor's degree	79	76	70	57	77
.Advanced degree	85	75	79	62	83
By Family Income					
.Income not reported	53	45	36	26	49
.Less than $10,000	47	60	35	40	49
.$10,000 to $14,999	48	68	44	28	51
.$15,000 to $19,999	55	71	41	37	56
.$20,000 to $29,999	58	65	43	46	56
.$30,000 to $39,999	64	73	47	34	62
.$40,000 to $49,999	68	65	55	41	65
.$50,000 to $74,999	73	77	57	49	71
.$75,000 to $99,999	78	78	68	71	76
.$100,000 to $149,999	81	77	70	58	78
.$150,000 and over	84	78	80	61	82
By Citizenship Attainment					
.U.S. Born	66	65	48	45	64
.Naturalized	57	59	54	49	54

Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in the cell are the number of people who reported voted divided by the numbers of citizens.

Table 4-1 Estimating Asian Turnout

	Turnout (Full Sample)	
	B	s.e.
Acculturation		
Length of Residency	.06***	.01
English (home)	.09	.16
Group Connectedness		
Shared Fate with Asians	-.13	.20
Shared Culture	.35**	.11
Discrimination	.34	.21
Group Identity		
"American"	.64	.38
"Asian American"	.84**	.30
"Ethnic American"	.57*	.24
Demographics		
Asian-Born	-1.09***	.30
Chinese	.52	.27
Japanese	-.42	.41
Filipinos	-.24	.28
Age	.03***	.01
Education (College +)	.40	.23
Income (Above $60K)	.26	.21
Female	.24	.20
Political Interest	.33**	.11
Partisanship (Strong)	.50*	.23
Religous attendance	.27***	.07
Constant	-4.92***	.71
-2 Likelihood	661.26	
Pseudo R-Square	.22	
Pr > chi2	< .001	
N	613	

Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001.
Note: Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regressions with standard errors in parentheses.
***: $p < .001$, **: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$.

Table 4-2 Estimating Asian American Group Identity

	"American"		"Asia American"		"Ethnic American"	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Acculturation						
Length of Residency	.03	.02	.03*	.01	.04**	.01
English (home)	1.82***	.27	.96***	.19	.51**	.16
Group Connectedness						
Shared Fate with other Asians	-.46	.37	.18	.30	-.08	.24
Shared Fate with the ethnic group	.11	.37	.17	.30	.34	.24
Shared Culture	.24	.17	.36**	.14	.09	.11
Discrimination	-.80*	.34	-.60*	.26	-.51*	.20
Demographics						
Asian-Born	-1.71***	.45	-.83*	.39	-.52	.34
Chinese	-.60	.57	-.50	.31	.03	.23
Japanese	-.39	.53	-1.34*	.54	-.41	.43
Filipinos	-.32	.45	-.28	.37	.42	.30
Age	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Education (College)	.41	.38	-.18	.27	.18	.22
Income (Above $60K)	.03	.34	-.01	.28	.29	.22
Female	-.87**	.31	-.64**	.24	-.41*	.19
Constant	-4.33***	1.01	-2.39**	.76	-1.33*	.63
-2 Likelihood	1568.34					
Pseudo R-Square	.15					
Pr > chi2	< .001					
N	713					

Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001.
Note: The reference group (base category) is those who identify as "Asian" or "ethnic" only. Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regressions with standard errors in parentheses.
***: $p < .001$, **: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$.

Table 5-1 The Experimental Design

Candidates	A: Mentioning the origin of candidate's parents	B: No mentioning of the origin of candidate's parents
1. One Chinese surname, one common American surname	Chen, China	Chen
2. One Asian Indian surname, one common American surname	Iyengar, India	Iyengar
Control: Both candidates are shown with common American surnames		

Figure 3-1 Ratios of Adult Citizens to Voting Age Population by Race and Hispanic Origin



Figure 3-2 Registration Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin



Figure 3-3 Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin



Figure 3-4 Voting Rates among the Registered by Race and Hispanic Origin



Figure 3-5 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education, Race and Ethnicity



Figure 3-6 Predicted Probability of Voting by Income, Race and Ethnicity



Figure 3-7 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (Foreign-born)



Figure 3-8 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (U.S.-born)



Figure 4-1 Conceptual Framework



Figure 4-2 Distribution of Group Identity by Ethnicity



Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001.

Figure 5-1 Likely Turnout by Treatment



One-Way ANOVA: $F = 3.37$, $p < .05$, n=296.

Figure 5-2 Likely Turnout by Treatment (Chinese and Asian Indians Only)



One-Way ANOVA: $F = 0.46, p > .10$, n=61.



One-Way ANOVA: $F = 2.81, p < .05$, n=90.

Figure 5-3 Likely Turnout by Matching Voters' and Candidates' Ethnicities



Results of Comparing Means: $t = 3.90, p < .001$, n=296

Figure 5-4 Distribution of Political Participation



Figure 5-5 Distribution of Political Participation (0-7 Scale)



Figure 5-6 Likely Turnout by Treatment and Previous Political Engagement



One-Way ANOVA: $F = 3.49, p < .05$, n=162.

One-Way ANOVA: $F = 1.16, p > .10$, n=134.

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